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 Analysts have long argued that Latin American countries will not implement 
tough counterdrug policies because: (1) they view drugs as a demand-side (U.S.) 
problem; (2) drugs play a central role in their economies; (3) there are strong pressures 
from domestic interest groups not to; and (4) international pressure can only generate 
minimal compliance.  Despite this, a variety of governments have implemented tough 
policies since the mid-1990s.  The explanation: a president’s “grand strategy” mediates 
the influence of the four aforementioned factors.   This thesis examines the case of 
Bolivia, in which President Hugo Banzer implemented a very successful eradication 
strategy (Plan Dignidad) because he believed a positive international image was 
necessary for his country’s economic development.  Subsequent presidents lacked grand 
strategies that justified tough counterdrug policies; therefore, they mostly focused on 
meeting minimal requirements to avoid decertification by the United States.   
 The thesis also addresses the factors that influence the effectiveness and 
sustainability of counterdrug policies.  It challenges the conventional wisdom that Plan 
Dignidad was not sustainable because it was based on forced eradication and the 
militarization of the Chapare.  It shows instead that the Plan would have been sustainable 
if not for a premature push into the Yungas.  It also demonstrates that “forced” 
eradication depends on firm but fair negotiations with cocaleros, backed by a public 
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A. PURPOSE OF THESIS  
For decades, the United States government has been unwavering in its support for 
a set of drug control policies focused heavily on eradication in drug-producing countries 
and has believed that the main obstacle to success in Latin America’s drug war has been 
the lack of political will among partner nation governments.  Scholars have expounded on 
this lack of political will, listing the reasons why the implementation of tough 
counterdrug policies is not in the political or economic interest of Latin American 
governments.  Historically, U.S. policymakers have either ignored these constraints or 
argued that bold leadership is enough to overcome them.  The lack of tough counterdrug 
policies in the region prior to the mid-1990s seemed to confirm the scholars’ views.  
However, since that time, the governments of Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000) in Peru, 
Andres Pastrana (1998-2002) and Alvaro Uribe (2002-present) in Colombia, and Hugo 
Banzer (1998-2001) in Bolivia have all implemented tough counterdrug policies.  In Peru 
and Bolivia, coca eradication policies resulted in a 54% and 70% drop, respectively, in 
the number of hectares under cultivation.1  On one hand, the willingness of these 
governments to fight drugs and their initial success seems to support the U.S. 
government’s take on the centrality of bold leadership.   On the other hand, the drastic 
change in drug control policy in Bolivia since 2001 and particularly under the 
government of Evo Morales (2006-present) seems to support the more traditional 
academic viewpoint. 
This thesis examines Bolivian drug control policy over the past decade in an 
effort to adjudicate between these competing views regarding the factors that drive the 
formulation of drug control policies.  It also analyzes the factors necessary for the 
successful implementation and sustainability of drug control policies over time – factors 
which may be different from the conditions that shape policy formulation. 
                                                 
1 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2006 (New York:  United Nations, 





The Bolivian case highlights the complexity and the challenge—for both the Latin 
American governments and the U.S. government—of establishing and implementing a 
counterdrug policy.  The past three Bolivian administrations have attempted to balance 
U.S. pressures with the need to pursue their own interests, which at times have either 
favored or contradicted those of the United States.  The thesis will demonstrate how a 
variety of forces can create an unstable environment for an effective and sustainable drug 
policy. 
This chapter reviews the conventional wisdom about the main factors that affect 
the formulation and implementation of drug control policies.  First, it identifies the 
reasons academic and policy analysts typically give for the lack of tough counterdrug 
policies observed in the region throughout much of the 1980s and the first half of the 
1990s.  Next, it details the emphasis U.S. policy makers place on the importance of 
“political will” in shaping drug control policies. The third section then offers a critique of 
both schools of thought and outlines a more comprehensive “political economy” 
approach to understanding the formulation and implementation of effective and 
sustainable drug control policies.  The final section provides an overview of the 
organization of the thesis. 
B. THE ACADEMIC AND POLICY LITERATURE 
Conventional wisdom in the academic and policy literature is that Latin American 
governments do not have an incentive to put into effect the kinds of policies the United 
States advocates.  Four factors are usually identified as important in shaping the choice of 
counterdrug policies:  (1) views on the nature of the drug problem; (2) the role of drugs in 
the economy; (3) pressures from domestic interest groups; and (4) international pressure, 
primarily from the United States. 
First, drugs are often seen by both Latin American elites and the Latin American 





drug market in the world and, thus, [is] the engine that drives the drug trade.”2  Scholars 
point out that the forces of supply and demand cannot be ignored, and that the United 
States must concentrate the “bulk of their efforts on reducing demand within the United 
States”3 and on “domestic criminal organizations involved in drug trafficking and the 
laundering of drug proceeds;”4 otherwise, they argue, the perennial drug problem will 
persist.  Many Latin Americans agree with this view and are resentful of being asked to 
implement politically and economically costly drug control policies in order to address 
what is characterized as a U.S. problem. 
Second, it is widely believed that leaders in drug-producing countries will not 
implement tough counterdrug policies because drugs are too important to the economies 
of their countries.  For example, by the mid-1990s, Bolivia was earning roughly four 
percent of its Gross Domestic Product from the cocaine industry.5  The significant 
amount that gets reinvested into the economy creates new jobs that the government itself 
cannot create.  The illicit industry is responsible for employing approximately 74,000 
persons, about three percent of the workforce in the country.  This number, however, 
does not reflect the cocaine’s indirect employment effect, which benefits an additional 
16,000-18,000 people.6  In an effort to launder their profits, drug traffickers invest their 
illicit revenues in sectors of the economy.  In 1995 alone, Bolivia repatriated income 
from the cocaine trade amounting to $714 million in 1995.7 
 
                                                 
2 Jose Luis Reyna, “Narcotics as a Destabilizing Force for Source Countries and Non-source 
Countries,” in The Latin American Narcotics Trade and U.S. National Security, ed. Donald J. Mabry (New 
York: Greenwood Press, 1989), 126.  
3 Donald J. Mabry and Raphael Perl, “Concluding Observations and Policy Recommendations,” in The 
Latin American Narcotics Trade and U.S. National Security, 161.  
4 Ibid., 160. 
5 Patrick L. Clawson and Rensselaer W. Lee III, The Andean Cocaine Industry, (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1996), 13. 
6 Ibid., 15-16. 
7 Rensselaer Lee, “Perversely Harmful Effects of Counter-Narcotics Policy in the Andes,” in The 
Political Economy of the Drug Industry: Latin America and the International System, ed. Menno Vellinga 





Third, key domestic groups oppose, and none support, radical drug control 
policies because they undermine their own interests or they cause severe social injustices 
in coca-growing regions.  Raphael Perl explains that effective counterdrug policies are 
often met with “active and violent opposition from a combination of trafficker, political, 
and economic groups.”8  As one knowledgeable analyst noted in 1989: “The Bolivian 
government… does not dare eradicate coca plantations without the consent of the 
powerful growers’ federations.  To do so would risk provoking a civil war in Bolivia.”9  
Coca grower unions enjoy enormous support from the predominantly indigenous 
population that sees coca as a cultural right.  Traditionally, coca leafs are chewed, used 
for spiritual and medical purposes and consumed in tea as a stimulant, appetite 
suppressant, and remedy for stomach aliments.10   This cultural right is reinforced by 
Bolivia’s Law 1008, which permits the growth of 12,000 hectares of coca in the Yungas.  
In addition, efforts to eradicate illicit plots exacerbate tensions over class and ethnicity; 
the indigenous population sees resistance against eradication as part of taking a firm 
stand against the ruling classes.11 
More broadly, Rensselaer W. Lee III notes that “the cocaine industry as a whole 
has accumulated significant political clout.”12   Counterdrug efforts may threaten the 
interests of corrupt politicians, who receive bribes from drug organizations, and political 
leaders, who need the support of coca growers to secure their reelection.  At the very 
least, politicians need to provide general political and economic stability, something 
which can be threatened by the social protests that eradication efforts often unleash.   
                                                 
8 Raphael Perl, “Drug Control: International Policy and Approaches,” CRS Report for Congress. 
(Washington, DC: Library of Congress, February 2, 2006), 8.   
9 Rensselar W. Lee, The White Labyrinth: Cocaine and Political Power, (London: Transaction 
Publishers, 1989), 235. 
10 Connie Veillette and Carolina Navarrete-Frias, “Drug Crop Eradication and Alternative 
Development in the Andes,” CRS Report for Congress. (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, November 
18, 2005), 3. 
11 Clare Ribando and Connie Veillette, “Bolivia: Political and Economic Developments and 
Implications for U.S.  Policy," CRS Report for Congress. (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, January 
25, 2005), 12. 





Fourth, academics stress that U.S. efforts to influence the counterdrug policies of 
Latin American government are usually futile.  Threats to decertify governments for non-
compliance, a measure which would cut off all non-counterdrug assistance to a country, 
at most secure only half-hearted support for counterdrug policies.  On the one hand, a 
show of compliance is usually enough to forestall decertification. On the other hand, full 
compliance can undermine domestic support for the government and even threaten 
government stability. 
C. U.S. GOVERNMENT VIEWS ON POLITICAL WILL 
Conventional wisdom among U.S. policy makers suggests that the political will of 
a government is essential to curb the drug problem.  For example, Senator Mitch 
McConnell, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, 
and Related Programs, during the Joint Hearing on Supplemental Request for Plan 
Colombia, opened the hearing by noting “…there is no substitute for aggressive political 
leadership in Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador.”13  The United States is more 
willing to allocate funds to countries that implement aggressive policies and demonstrate 
political will, as in the case of Colombia.14  Under Secretary of State Thomas R. 
Pickering adds that, “It does not work if the countries themselves are not prepared to gear 
up and do the job.”15 
The United States once praised and rewarded Bolivia, seeing it as a model of 
aggressive political will.  The Press briefing on release of 1998 International Narcotics 
Control Strategy Report extolled Bolivia for showing resolve and political will in 
continuing to reduce coca production “despite continuing violence against eradication 
and counternarcotics forces.”16  General Barry McCaffrey, Director of the Office of 
National Drug Control Policy, similarly argued that the success that Plan Dignidad 
                                                 
13 U.S. Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations for Fiscal Year 
2001, H.R. 4811 and 5526/S. 2522, February 24, 2000, 2. 
14 Ibid., 3. 





enjoyed during this time was thanks to the leadership of the Banzer government.17  In the 
words of Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman during his report to congress in June 2001, 
“Bolivia has provided some important lessons for all of its neighbors about how strong 
political will has taken one nation out of the illicit drug business and has controlled the 
supply of precursor chemicals.”18  However, once Bolivia did not fully live up to its 
goals, and its political will weakened in the face of serious coca grower contestation and 
protest, “Ambassador Rocha warned that U.S. assistance was tied to the political will of 
the Bolivian government to eradicate coca, and that without it $120 million in aid would 
disappear.”19 
U.S. policymakers believe that political will does not arise entirely from U.S. 
pressure.  Countries should have their own reasons for wanting to address the production 
and trafficking of drugs.  In particular, Latin American leaders should address the drug 
trade because it is a dilemma that threatens the stability of governments across the 
Americas.20  Drug use is growing among Latin American population, plaguing those 
countries’ greatest assets; furthermore, increased violence and corruption in the region 
will only serve to aggrandize the threat against Latin American governments.    
D. A POLITICAL ECONOMY APPROACH:  UNDERSTANDING “GRAND 
STRATEGY” 
Each of the two existing approaches has something to offer in terms of 
understanding the formulation and implementation of counterdrug policies.  The 
                                                 
16 United States, Department of State.  Press briefing on release of International Narcotics Control 
Strategy Report 1998, February 26, 1999; available from 
http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1999/990226_beers_narc_briefing.html, (accessed 16 August 
2007).  
17 General Barry McCaffrey, Secretary Albright, et al., Press Briefing on the President's Narcotics 
Certification Decisions, Washington, DC (March 1, 2000), International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 
1999, http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/2000/000301a.html, (accessed 16 August 2007).  
18 Hearing and Markup before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere of the Committee on 
International Relations House of Representatives, 107th Congress (Washington, DC: Government Printing 
Office, June 28, 2001), 8.   
19 Eduardo A. Gamarra, “Has Bolivia Won the War? Lessons from Plan Dignidad,” Latin American 
and Caribbean Center Department of Political Science Florida International University, April 2002, 16. 






academic emphasis on the ideas, interests, and power of key advocacy groups and 
government actors is fundamentally sound, but has been biased in its application.  It has 
focused too much on explaining the forces arrayed against drug control and has failed to 
acknowledge the possible reasons governments might have for adopting tough policies.  
The U.S. political will approach, in contrast, highlights the arguments that could be made 
on behalf of tough counterdrug policies but does not explain when these arguments will 
actually gain traction with Latin American governments.  This approach also fails to take 
into account the vast interests that are affected by these policies-- interests which 
undermine the policies’ sustainability and medium to long term effectiveness. 
This thesis employs a political economy approach to identify, review, and 
evaluate the factors that shape the formulation and drug control policies.  It also identifies 
the conditions under which the Latin American governments can establish a counterdrug 
policy that will be effective and, most importantly, sustainable.   It does so by addressing 
the following questions: 
1. What factors have affected the formulation of counterdrug policy in Bolivia over 
the past decade? 
2.   What factors have shaped the effectiveness and sustainability of counterdrug 
policy in Bolivia over the past decade?  Is it just a matter of the political will to 
implement the correct set of policies?  Or must policy prescriptions be modified to ensure 
their sustainability in the face of foreseeable pressures? 
The thesis argues that the formulation of counterdrug policy is shaped primarily 
by a president’s “grand strategy” for economic and political development.  In that regard, 
a government’s “grand strategy” refers to where the national leadership is trying to take 
the country.  A country’s “where” can take the shape of strengthening its economy by 
promoting social advances or reaching a leadership position in a world counsel. Policies 
in all other governmental areas are then subordinated to this overarching strategy.  In the 
area of drug control, a president’s “grand strategy” shapes the four factors identified by 
academics: views on the drug war, the influence of domestic pressure groups, perceptions 





Banzer defied academic conventional wisdom because his greater national 
strategy served to justify tough counterdrug policies.  Banzer’s plan was to make Bolivia 
a strategic producer of gas for South America and a provider of the same to the California 
market.  His free-market economics driven by development of the oil sector, however, 
required foreign investment.  Banzer believed that Bolivia needed to remove the stigma 
of being a drug-producing country in order to attract foreign investment and other 
financial assistance.  The United States’ monetary assistance and political support for 
Bolivia would help secure loans from the International Monetary Fund.  In June 2001, for 
example, the World Bank’s International Development Association forgave about $2 
billion of Bolivia’s debt in order to boost the government’s poverty-alleviation 
programs.21  Additionally, in 2001 the Paris Consultative Group of donors, for the first 
time in its fourteen years of existence, pledged to Bolivia aid totaling $1.36 billion.22  
Banzer’s grand strategy for Bolivia’s development required that it be viewed favorably 
by the international community and his counterdrug policies were designed to serve that 
goal. 
In contrast, the administration of former cocalero leader, Evo Morales, seems to 
confirm conventional academic wisdom about the reasons for a lack of tough counterdrug 
policies.  Morales’ base support is also one of the strongest key domestic groups in the 
country.  Nevertheless, neither Morales’ background as a former coca grower, nor his 
wanting to keep his constituency group content, is sufficient to explain his 
counternarcotic policy.  Morales sees coca cultivation as more than an economic benefit 
for coca growers; he sees it as a political statement which supports the rights of a society 
that has been marginalized.  By reviewing Morales “grand strategy” one can truly 
understand the factors that shape his counterdrug strategy. 
With regards to the implementation of policies, this thesis challenges the 
conventional wisdom that forced eradication is a primarily coercion-based strategy that is 
inherently unstable.  It argues that the gains of Plan Dignidad in the Chapare could have 
                                                 
21 Latin American Weekly Report, “Further Debt Relief for Bolivia,” WR-01-24 (19 June 2001), 285. 






been sustained if not for the government’s decision to try to extend the plan to the 
Yungas.  The decision to extend the plan was driven more by President’s Quiroga’s 
desire to demonstrate his resolve, but failed to carry out the negotiations and public 
relations campaign that were key to the success in the Chapare.  In sum, the initial 
success of Plan Dignidad shows that Bolivian leaders do have a margin within which to 
maneuver, but its failure demonstrates that this margin is more limited than the “political 
will” argument suggests. 
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This thesis will examine the political economy of the counterdrug policy in 
Bolivia through a process tracing approach as multiple events case study.  The framework 
developed in this chapter will be applied to understand the counterdrug policies of four 
presidential administrations in Bolivia over the past decade. 
The second chapter reviews the counterdrug policies of the administration of 
Hugo Banzer (1997-2001).  This section will show that Banzer implemented a 
counterdrug policy (Plan Dignidad) in alignment with the United States defying 
conventional academic wisdom that Latin American governments will not implement 
tough counterdrug policies.  It will explain how the administration’s “grand strategy” for 
Bolivian development led to these policies and helped secure initial public support for a 
tough counterdrug policy.  Finally, the chapter shows that the government’s strategy was 
successful in forcefully eradicating coca in the Chapare region and did so with relatively 
little social unrest, much to the surprise of most analysts. 
The third chapter describes and explains the unraveling of the success of Plan 
Dignidad at the end of the Banzer administration and under subsequent presidents Jorge 
Quiroga (2001-2002), Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada (2002-2003), and Carlos Mesa (2003-
2005).  The latter two administrations came into office at a time when Plan Dignidad’s 
momentum was dwindling while the coca growers were gaining influence and impetus.  
Lacking “grand strategies” that might act as a countervailing pressure, both President 
Sanchez de Lozada and interim President Mesa were buffeted by coca growing protests 





The fourth chapter will review the counterdrug policies of the administration of 
Evo Morales (2006-present).  On the one hand, this portion of the thesis seems to confirm 
conventional academic wisdom concerning the lack of tough counterdrug policies.  
Conventional explanations, however, would lead us to expect Morales’ drug policies to 
deviate even more than they have from U.S. demands since Morales was formerly head 
of a coca grower union before becoming president.  An understanding of Morales’ grand  
strategy of reducing national poverty and removing racial discrimination – which 
depends upon a certain level of international assistance – helps explain a certain element 
of pragmatism in Morales’ counterdrug policies. 
Sources used consist of scholarly literature on the benefits, problems, and 
recommendations involved in the perennial struggle in the drug war.  The Congressional 
Research Service has published a myriad of up-to-date documents that review and assess 
the U.S. and drug-source countries’ views, strategies, and effects of their contemporary 
drug strategy.  In addition, U.S. Senate and Congress Hearings, State Department 
documents, newspaper articles, and statements from key officials were examined to 
understand and assess the U.S. approach to an effective counterdrug strategy.  Finally, 
members of the U.S. Embassy’s Narcotics Affairs Section in La Paz and former and 
current Bolivian government officials were interviewed during a September 2007 site 





II. PLAN DIGNIDAD – INITIAL SUCCESS 
During the 1980s and early 1990s, Bolivia displayed no signs of progress in 
decreasing coca cultivation, despite the millions of dollars in aid given to the country 
each year by various countries and organizations to target this problem.  Bolivia, like 
many other drug-source countries in Latin America, limited itself to meeting only 
minimal eradication targets to avoid decertification, which would interrupt the flow of 
U.S. monetary assistance.  Bolivia’s lack of commitment to tough counterdrug policies 
can be explained by the four factors discussed in the preceding chapter: (1) key domestic 
interest groups that benefit from the drug production cycle and none that benefit from 
eradication; (2)  the view that the drug problem is a matter of demand and should be 
addressed in the United States; (3) the fact that drugs play a central role in the economy, 
and their cultivation cannot be attacked without damaging economic well-being; and (4) 
U.S. pressure exerted through a certification process that does not generate real 
compliance. 
Despite this, at the outset of 1998, Bolivia implemented Plan Dignidad, a highly 
aggressive strategy responsible for the almost complete eradication of coca in the 
Chapare region, one of the two main coca growing regions in the country.  How can this 
unprecedented embrace of aggressive counterdrug policies be explained?  Although U.S. 
pressure might have played a role in President Hugo Banzer’s institution of a more 
aggressive counterdrug strategy, it does not sufficiently answer why Banzer committed 
himself to an aggressive campaign that jeopardized his social capital, especially when all 
that was needed were slight efforts to meet with the minimum requirements called for by 
the United States.  This thesis will show that Banzer’s counterdrug policies only make 
sense when viewed within the context of his overall grand strategy for creating an 
economic, social, and political environment fertile for foreign investment. 
Banzer’s U.S.-oriented neoliberal economic policies shaped his administration’s 
view of the impact of drugs on the Bolivian economy and increased his dependence on 
U.S. assistance.  Banzer wanted to remove the stigma of being a drug-producing country 





campaign that eventually won the support of the Bolivian population’s for adoption of 
such tough antinarcotics measures.  This support, in turn, bolstered the government’s 
position in negotiations with cocaleros that were crucial to the success of the 
government’s policy of forced eradication. 
This chapter will begin by providing a historical background of coca cultivation in 
Bolivia and the country’s counterdrug efforts prior to 1998, showing that counterdrug 
efforts were half-hearted even in the face of decertification.  The next section explains 
why president Banzer chose to implement Plan Dignidad, an ambitious counterdrug 
program that was part of his grand strategy for the economic development of Bolivia.  It 
concludes by showing that Plan Dignidad was, initially, very successful and resulted in 
the eradication of a large amount of coca without unleashing the high levels of violence 
that were predicted by most analysts. 
A. COCA CULTIVATION IN BOLIVIA & COUNTERDRUG EFFORTS 
PRE-1998 
Coca has been chewed by peasants in Bolivia for thousands of years in order to 
repress hunger and alleviate altitude sickness.  However, the coca-cocaine boom of the 
late 1970s lured to the country powerful drug traffickers who became entrenched in the 
coca growing regions and undermined the already weak political and social institutions of 
the country.  Historically, the Yungas region has grown Bolivia’s licit coca and has been 
the main supplier to the markets for traditional coca users,23 while the Chapare region has 
been known to grow much of the unauthorized coca. 
By the 1980s, Bolivia played a major role in the production of coca leaf for the 
international cocaine market.  Bolivia, a country with the highest number of military 
coups in Latin America, was too weak to combat drug traffickers.24  Democratic elections  
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in 1982 brought to the Presidency Hernan Siles Suazo who reopened the inflow of U.S. 
aid and created, with the help of the United States, a rural drug police to help in the new 
drug control efforts. 
In 1983 narcotraffickers began to gain control over the Chapare, and the state’s 
presence and influence in the area began to collapse and disappear.  In 1986, the state 
regained control through the militarization of the region, after defeating the drug lords 
through surgical operations aimed at targeting laboratories, traffickers’ ranches and 
strongholds.  Through sources within the government, many traffickers got wind of such 
operations and began to flee to Panama City.25  The damage created by the drug kingpins, 
however, had already taken root: the institutions created prior to 1983 practically 
disappeared during the reign of the drug traffickers.26 
In an additional effort to address the drug trade, the Bolivian government passed 
Law 1008 in 1988 in order to regulate coca production in Bolivia.  At that time, 80,000 
hectares of coca were being cultivated in the Yungas and Chapare regions.  Law 1008 
broke down the areas of coca production into three zones:  1. zones for traditional 
production; 2. excess zones (or transitional zones); and 3. zones of illicit production.  The 
Chapare was designated as an excess zone, where coca production would be tolerated but 
also targeted for reduction.  Only 12,000 hectares were designated as legal (for traditional 
production) and these were limited to the Yungas region.  Since the law categorized the 
leaf as a controlled substance, individuals cultivating outside the legal boundaries were 
considered criminals.27  Despite this law, the lack of a strong state presence in the coca 
growing regions left the government in a position too weak to adopt new and effective 
strategies.  Likewise, many alternative development plans offered under Law 1008 were 
extremely difficult to implement. 
                                                 
24 Kevin Healy, “Coca, the State, and the Peasantry in Bolivia, 1982-1988.” Journal of Inter-
American Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 22/3, Special Issue: Assessing the Americas’ War on 
Drugs. (Summer – Autumn, 1988), 105.  
25 Elaine Shannon, Desperados: Latin Drug Lords, U.S. Lawmen, and the War America Can’t Win, 
(New York: Viking Penguin Group, Inc, 1988), 362-363. 
26 Scott B. MacDonald, Dancing on a Volcano: The Latin American Drug Trade, (New York: 
Praeger, 1988), 59-60.  





Overall, the pre-Plan Dignidad period can be characterized as maintaining the 
status quo and meeting the minimum requirements necessary to insure the continuance of 
U.S. aid.  During his first term as president (1993-1997), Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada’s 
primary focus was on the economy, including the privatization of five major state-owned 
companies.  As a result, he paid little attention to the War on Drugs.28  By the end of 
Sanchez de Lozada’s term, Bolivia was on the verge of decertification by the United 
States because he had not met eradication quotas; however, he eventually met those 
quotas by accomplishing minimal requirements – a strategy typical of Latin American 
countries.29  Sanchez de Lozada’s response illustrates how threats of decertification can 
lead to superficial compliance but not to tough policies. 
In March 1995, Bolivia was decertified for the first time for its weak performance 
on eradication, but was granted a national interest waiver.  Ambassador Kamman, 
however, “...issued a confidential ultimatum – threatening to decertify the country [and 
revoke the national interest waiver] by June 30, 1995, if coca eradication targets were not 
met.”30  President Sanchez de Lozada’s reaction to this threat was not to overhaul the 
voluntary eradication system and push for a more aggressive approach; instead, he 
pressed on to meet his country’s initial commitment destroying the additional 7,000 
hectares of coca plantation needed for the year.  After meeting resistance from coca 
growers, Sanchez de Lozada was forced to militarize the Chapare, though he did not 
change his goal or means (i.e., voluntary eradication): 
On April 18, 1995, the government declared a three-month state of siege 
in response to widespread social protest and in order to complete required 
eradication efforts by June.  The state of siege, which lasted six months, 
established a curfew, banned meetings, and sparked mass detentions of 
coca growers and other leaders. At its conclusion, the government finally 
reached its goal through voluntary eradication by cocaleros.31 
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Once Sanchez de Lozada accomplished his minimum requirements, he regressed to his 
original stance.  Having faced immediate confrontation with coca growers, his surge was 
conducted in a vacuum and with a limited objective.  As a result, throughout his tenure 
net coca cultivations level (i.e., overall hectares of cultivation minus hectares eradicated) 
stayed relatively the same.32  (See Table 1) 
                 
Table 1.   Eradication and Seizures Under the Sanchez de Lozada Administration.33  
 
Although it did not pursue forced eradication, presumably because of the social 
protest and instability that would result, the Sanchez de Lozada administration did take 
some strong counterdrug stands that were more politically feasible.  The Bolivian 
government, for example, admitted for the first time that coca grown in the Chapare was 
exclusively for use by the cocaine industry; and it signed an extradition treaty with the 
United States that would send some Bolivians to U.S. trials and jails.34  It also intensified 
its efforts targeting the production of cocaine, as opposed to the cultivation of coca (See 
Table 1). 
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B. FORMULATING PLAN DIGNIDAD: PART OF A “GRAND STRATEGY” 
 In 1997, former General Hugo Banzer was elected president of Bolivia, and he 
brought with him a plan to deepen neoliberal economic reforms in Bolivia.  No one 
expected him to take a strong stance on drug control.  His party Accion Democratica 
Nacionalista (ADN) had affiliations with the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria 
(MIR), whose leader, Jaime Paz Zamora, was suspected of having ties with a prominent 
Bolivian drug trafficker during Zamora’s previous presidential administration.  
Furthermore, Banzer refused to sever his ties with Movimiento de Izquierda 
Revolucionaria (MIR), placing him in an even more questionable position in the eyes of 
the United States.35  In addition, Banzer and his family were suspected of ties to drug 
traffickers dating back to his period as dictator of Bolivia from 1971 to 1978. 
 Despite his suspect connections, in 1998 Banzer launched the most effective and 
aggressive eradication program Bolivia has ever seen.   This can be explained by 
Banzer’s “grand strategy” for Bolivia’s development.  All decisions he made as president, 
in particular the adoption of Plan Dignidad, were in support of his grand strategy – to 
develop Bolivia economically and make it the center of energy in South America.  This 
required heavy foreign investment to not only build plants that would transform the gas 
into liquid gas, but also to build a pipeline through Chile that would facilitate shipment to 
California.  For this vision to succeed, Bolivia would need an image which was free from 
the stigmas of corruption, contraband, and narcotrafficking.36  Banzer would need to 
implement policies that would  strengthen his country’s, as well as his own, credibility in 
the international forum, thus increasing the amount of foreign assistance to his country 
and, of course, gaining U.S. favorability and assistance in facilitating international loans 
and debt relief. 
In order to enhance the government’s credibility in its seriousness about 
combating drugs, the Banzer administration put Vice President Jorge Quiroga at the 
forefront of the country’s counterdrug strategy.  The international community, media, and 
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U.S. diplomats respected and admired the American-educated Quiroga for his charismatic 
presentations, strong command of the English language, and his “…ease at 
communicating Bolivia’s message.”37  He was responsible for the implementation of 
Plan Dignidad, and was widely regarded as the author of the plan.38 
Fearing possible decertification would jeopardize U.S. anti-narcotic aid, as well as 
lead to the “loss of access to international development funds,”39 foreign direct 
investment, and the needed U.S. influence in the international arena, president Hugo 
Banzer set in motion the framework for Plan Dignidad.  While Banzer knew that drugs 
played a central role in the economy, his grand strategy would provide investment to 
replace that income and provide for greater levels of development.  In 2001, Banzer 
warned that “[t]he time [had] come for the world to value our action and translate this 
into investment that will generate employment to replace the jobs and income eliminated 
along with the coca fields, and open its markets to products that have replaced the volume 
of poison that we helped remove from [drug] consumption areas.” 40 
The overarching explanation for instituting the plan, therefore, dealt more with 
Banzer’s overall grand strategy that would create an economic, social, and political 
environment fertile for foreign investment.  The country’s strong association with drugs 
and its characterization as a narco-democracy played an integral role in the adoption of 
Plan Dignidad.  The strategy’s objective was to regain the dignity of the Bolivian people 
through removal of the coca-cocaine stigma so that the international community would 
feel comfortable investing in Bolivia.41  Most Bolivians understood the negative 
connotation the international stigma brought upon them and wished to remove that 
characterization; in 1999, a Bolivian Vice-Minister said, “Bolivia is tired of living under 
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the stigma of narcotraffickers, we’re tired of being considered a nation of 
narcotraffickers.”42  The Bolivian government played off this sentiment and achieved 
public support by building its public relations around this cry.  The motivating factor 
behind the tough counterdrug policies was the Banzer administration’s whole-hearted 
belief “that illicit crop cultivation and production actually hurt Bolivia’s development 
prospects and international image.”43 
Prior to Plan Dignidad, Bolivians had been more tolerant of coca growers and had 
even encouraged the government to negotiate with farmers and increase alternative 
development spending.  However, several factors caused these views to change and made 
it even more possible for Plan Dignidad to take place.  First, as previously stated, 
Bolivians were tired of the narco-stigma.  Second, the periodic demonstrations, 
blockades, and marches onto urban areas would disrupt the daily lives of urbanites, 
whose tolerance of coca farmers, as a result, decreased.  Thus, urban dwellers believed 
that complete eradication of coca in the Chapare would also bring to an end the endless 
road marches.  Third, the government focused its public relations campaign on linking 
the Chapare coca growers with the hated drug-traffickers.  During the 1990s, some 
Chapare dwellers turned from coca growing to producing cocaine; once this link was 
established, it became much easier to win the support of the rest of the country for coca 
eradication in the Chapare.44 
C. IMPLEMENTING PLAN DIGNIDAD: INITIAL SUCCESS 
 Plan Dignidad was the proposed strategy that would solve the narcotic problem in 
Bolivia.  The plan had a four-pronged approach, which included eradication, alternative 
development, interdiction, and prevention and rehabilitation within a period of five years.  
Between 1998 and 2002, the goal was to reduce coca production by 38,000 hectares and 
provide an alternative crop to 35,000 families.  Interestingly, the militarization of the 
Chapare, which came to be synonymous with the plan, was not part of the original 
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design.  It came about not to force eradication upon coca growers but was an impromptu 
response to prevent their promised demonstrations that would significantly disrupt the 
daily flow of subsistence and commerce to the cities of Cochabamba, La Paz, and Santa 
Cruz.  The government’s preemptive operation led to the stationing of military units 
which facilitated the use of forced eradication, both of which were not part of the original 
plan.  Even more surprising, the militarization process and success of the plan’s 
ambitious eradication goal was met with limited violence. 
1. The Plan Evolves: Forced Eradication and Militarization of the 
Chapare 
 On August 6, 1997, a member of the Banzer administration was in direct 
negotiations with cocalero leader Evo Morales to get him to eradicate the rest of the 
targeted 7,000 hectares of coca; however, Morales stalled negotiations, promises were 
unfulfilled, and nothing was done.  In October 1997, the Bolivian government, press, and 
Chapare coca grower unions, including Morales, again met to discuss the dilemma of 
meeting eradication goals and the failures of the coca grower unions to meet those 
demands.  In order to meet eradication goals that year, the Banzer government 
approached one of the federations in the Chapare, Yungas del Chapare, and struck a deal 
with them: if they would voluntarily eradicate 500 hectares before the end of the year, the 
rest of the 7,000 hectares targeted would come from the other five federations.  By now, 
Morales found himself in a weak position and obliged to negotiate. The period of 
negotiations also led to the rumors of roadblocks that resulted in militarization. 45   
The challenges of those negotiations led the Banzer administration to realize that 
dealing with coca growers to convince them to eradicate the required hectares was 
inevitably going to be a long and arduous process.  A new approach had to be found. 46  
This new approach, called forced eradication, meant the government would stop giving 
compensation money for the eradication of coca.  Prior to Plan Dignidad, government 
payments of up to $2,900 per hectare provided growers the converse incentive to keep 
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planting coca.  Abolishing cash compensation forced coca growers to abandon the excess 
coca plots that had neither the government nor the traffickers as buyers.  To make up for 
the elimination of cash compensation, the government helped each community by 
providing it with the technical assistance needed for developing new crops.  The plan 
called for shifting compensation from the individual to the community on a quarterly 
basis, as shown below: 
 
1998: 
January – March: individuals would continue to receive $2,500 dollars per 
hectare, and the community would receive zero dollars; 
April – June: individuals would receive $1,650 and the community would receive 
$850; 
July – September: individuals would receive $800, and community would receive 
$1,700; 
October – December: only the community would receive $2,500. 
1999: 
January – September: community would receive $2,000; 
October – December: community would receive $1,500; 
2000: 
January – June: community would receive $1,500; 
July – December: community would receive $1,000. 
2001: 
January – March: community would receive $1,000; 
April – December: community would receive $500.47 
 
The Banzer government followed this plan and succeeded with it.  The offering of 
technical assistance to coca growers, in addition to some cash compensation, won the 
acquiescence of cocaleros to eradication.  Forced eradication refers to the free range of 
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authority of the government to remove or destroy coca that was on a person’s land or in 
public areas where the plant was not authorized to be grown; however, as the plan above 
suggests, forced eradication rested heavily, at least initially, on some element of 
negotiation. 
Another key ingredient for the success of Plan Dignidad was the militarization of 
the Chapare.  At the outset of 1998, rumors began to spread that coca growers were 
thinking about conducting a large protest and road block demonstration that would 
paralyze daily life, businesses, and government operations.  In order to ‘beat them to the 
punch’, in April 1998, the government pushed for a massive military operation to prevent 
such a block and to remove the excess coca which coca growers had been promising to 
eradicate, although the growers themselves had been stalling on fulfilling that promise.  
The operation was one of the largest the country had ever seen.  Large equipment had to 
be deployed to the Chapare: helicopters were used to bring in troops, logistics, and 
equipment.  Thus, the initial reason for sending the troops in was not to eradicate coca but 
to prevent the potential road blocks and demonstrations that would handicap that part of 
the country.48 
During this same time period, the United States helped the Bolivian government 
with funding to form a joint task force in the Chapare, composed of military and police, 
which would assist in the eradication of coca and the interdiction of chemical precursors 
and coca leaf.  In September 1999, the U.S. government reported that it would also help 
build three military camps in the region to house the newly formed Ninth Bolivian Army 
Division.49  The decision to maintain the military in the Chapare region was decisive and 
demonstrated Banzer’s political will.  This is especially true when one considers that 
experts prognosticated an increase of violence and shootings; however, the extremes of 
that assessment did not come to pass.50 
The increased military and police presence in the region facilitated the targeting 
of production and trafficking and delivered immediate and impressive results.  Based on 
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the money allocated, interdiction was the second most important factor of the Plan 
Dignidad strategy.  The government almost doubled the number of coca leaf seizures at 
the outset of Plan Dignidad, and in 1999 saw an increase in arrests, drugs, and chemical 
seizures.51  The Banzer government claimed significant success in this area and stated 
that its precursor interdiction policy was fundamental to the achievement of Plan 
Dignidad.  Drug traffickers were forced to use cheap alternative substances and rely on 
substitutes “for scarce and expensive chemicals smuggled in from neighboring countries 
and an inferior process to streamline base and HCl [hydrochloride] production,”52 which 
resulted in low quality cocaine.  This success led traffickers to shift the processing of 
coca into hydrochloride from Bolivia to Brazil, where chemicals were readily available.53   
The numbers indicate that Plan Dignidad was an overwhelming success.  From 
1993 to 1997, Bolivia’s illicit cultivation of coca bush and the production of cocaine 
averaged about 47,500 hectares (See Table 1).  In its first year, Plan Dignidad decreased 
that average by nearly 10,000 hectares.  In 1999 and 2000, the government sustained the 
already decreased levels and destroyed an additional 7,200 hectares each year.54    In 
2000, the INCSR praised Bolivia as the archetype for the region in coca eradication.55  
The government was so successful that by 2001 only 600 hectares of coca remained to be 
eradicated to meet the ultimate goal of “zero coca” in the Chapare region.   The 
accelerated eradication of coca crops caused an increase in the price of coca leaves from 
an average annual price per kilogram of $1.20 in 1997 to $5.60 in 2001.56  This trend is 
indicative of how Plan Dignidad caused a shortage of coca. 
According to Eduardo A. Gamarra, Plan Dignidad was one of three factors that 
helped reduce coca growing in Bolivia. The other two involved developments in Peru and 
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Colombia: first, Peru’s antinarcotics effort and policy of shooting down airplanes 
carrying coca paste from Bolivia and Peru into Colombia reduced the market for coca 
leaf.  Second, given the disruption in the supply of leaf from Bolivia and Peru and 
increasingly permissive conditions within Colombia for coca growing, Colombian drug 
lords made a strategic shift toward concentrating cocaine production in their own 
country.57  As a result, some argue that Bolivia’s success was the result of a “‘balloon’ 
effect, in which coca production shifts to other areas with less law enforcement 
presence.”58 
2. Violence in the Chapare 
Not only was Plan Dignidad successful in dramatically reducing levels of coca 
cultivation in the Chapare region, but it did so without the dramatic increase in social 
unrest and violence that most analysts predicted.59  A review of the U.S. State 
Department’s Report on Human Rights Practices between 1996 and 2001 shows that 
violence between security forces and protesters - be they coca growers, teachers, or 
miners – predated Plan Dignidad and did not increase significantly with its 
implementation.  Protests, road blocks, and demonstrations have always been the 
methods that the Bolivian rural population uses to affect policy.  In 1995 and 1996, 
before Plan Dignidad was in effect, clashes between the government and coca growers 
resulted in the deaths of five civilians in 1995 and two civilians in 1996.60  The armed 
and hostile coca growers “self-defense” group that emerged in 1996 would threaten and 
coerce farmers into growing coca in their fields and force them to repel eradicators.61  In 
1997, violence between coca growers and security forces claimed the lives of eight 
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people: five civilians and three police officers.62  The civilian deaths took place during 
demonstrations, while the police officers were killed during ambushes conducted by 
hostile coca growers.  The State Department Human Rights report for 1997 states that 
authorities tried to stay away from confronting the demonstrators, and only became 
involved once the crowd had turned violent or protesters had significantly interrupted 
civic duties.63 
During the initial implementation of Plan Dignidad in 1998, there was a slight 
increase in human rights violations against protesters, as well as incidents of violence, 
torture, and killings against security personnel on and off duty.  The year 1998 brought an 
increase of eight dead from the previous year:  thirteen civilians and two security forces. 
A Bolivian investigative group released its report on the death of the thirteen civilians 
killed in 1998 and revealed that only five cases could have resulted from conflict between 
illegal coca growers and security forces.64  Coca growers, however, continued to claim 
that all thirteen were the result of conflicts between these two parties. 
The State Department reported in its Bolivian Human Rights Report for 1998 that 
“…there [was] no credible evidence that the security forces used force except in self-
defense;”65 and that, “There were reports that coca growers unions used physical 
coercion and intimidation to prevent farm workers from cooperating with the  
Government in coca eradication. Indigenous groups complained that armed coca growers 
continued to invade their lands by force and coerce or bribe their members to cultivate 
illegal coca.”66 
In 1999, Security forces continued their eradication efforts in the Chapare; this 
time, however, there were no reported deaths and fewer reports of human rights 
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violations.67  There appeared to have been no deaths which resulted from confrontations 
between the government and cocaleros.  The absence of major clashes between security 
forces and illegal coca growers gave a strong indicator to the Bolivian government that its 
eradication efforts were yielding empirical and social results. 
In September and October 2000, a range of protesters, including illegal coca 
growers in the Chapare, indigenous farmers in the highlands, urban and rural teachers’ 
unions, and groups protesting a controversial municipal water project in Cochabamba 
staged a massive demonstration which led to the deaths of up to 10 civilians.68  It is 
unclear, however, how many coca growers were involved in the conflict (which came to 
be known as the “Water War”).   Nevertheless, the demonstration did earn coca grower 
leaders the attention of the Bolivian government.  In October 2000, Bolivian leaders and 
coca planters met to discuss negotiations; although the Bolivian government offered an 
additional $60 million to the Cochabamba region to support alternative development, the 
government was firm and resolute in its “zero coca” policy.69 
    
Taken from Ledebur, “Bolivia: Clear Consequences,” 164. 
Table 2.   Deaths and Injuries Incurred During Drug Control Efforts in the Chapare.  
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In January 2004, the Chapare Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office released a 
chart with the deaths and injuries incurred during drug control efforts in the Chapare.  A 
comparison of the U.S. Human Rights Report and the Ombudsman’s Office reveals that 
the numbers are the same with the exception of 1998.  The United States report claims 
that an internal investigation conducted by the Bolivian government concluded that only 
five deaths resulted from confrontations between coca growers and security forces; the 
Ombudsman Office claimed that nine deaths were involved.  In 2000, again there is a 
discrepancy between both reports: the U.S. Human Rights report is not clear on how 
many deaths involving coca growers occurred, while the above chart shows that only two 
fatalities took place.  (See Table 2) 
Overall, negotiations with leaders of peasant organizations appear to have been 
important in preventing an initial violent response to the government’s forced eradication 
efforts.   The Banzer government began negotiations with leaders of the coca federations 
over eliminating the compensation to individuals as an incentive for eradication and, 
subsequently, introduced new community incentives, instead.  In September 1997, 
Roland Vargas, one leader from the peasant organization replied, “We are demanding the 
fulfillment of previous agreements:  if this time around the promises are kept, there  
will be no more violence in the Chapare.”70  In addition, the Bolivian government had 
already publicly admitted and labeled the Chapare as an area where the coca harvest went 
solely for the production of cocaine.  This shift in public sentiment seems to have led 
coca growers to adopt a more cautious “wait and see” attitude with the government. 
D. CONCLUSION 
 Sanchez de Lozada’s first term as president focused very little on the counterdrug 
front.  Although it sought to eradicate and meet only minimal U.S. requirements, the 
administration found itself hard pressed to accomplish even that.  U.S. pressure affected 
the Sanchez de Lozada administration a great deal, which resulted in the administration 
admitting that the Chapare coca was mainly for the illicit production of cocaine and 
signing an extradition treaty with the United States; however, Sanchez de Lozada 
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continued to show little interest in adopting a more aggressive eradication strategy.    
Banzer, on the other hand, chose to adopt a more forceful counterdrug strategy because it 
supported his grand strategy of making Bolivia the “vital heart of South America.”  
Banzer embraced Plan Dignidad as a symbol of his economic desires and vision for his 
country to regain credibility, international respect, and monetary assistance, all of which 
were necessary in order to bring his grand strategy to fruition.  Plan Dignidad proved to 
be a success at an unprecedented level.  Initially, scholars predicted bloody clashes 
between coca growers and security forces, but the first several years of the plan’s 
implementation were no more bloody than previous years when voluntary eradication 
was in full effect, and the results in terms of reducing net coca cultivation levels far 













III. THE SUCCESS UNRAVELS: THE PUSH INTO THE YUNGAS 
 At the beginning of 2001, the Bolivian government enjoyed tremendous support 
and praise from the international community for having cut more than half of its coca 
cultivation level in just four years.  Emboldened by its success, the government decided 
to expand its strategy into the Yungas in mid-2001.  The government failed in this effort, 
which only served to galvanize coca growers in the Chapare and undermine the gains that 
had been made there.  Furthermore, the severe consequences of that decision debilitated 
subsequent presidential administrations that failed to engage coca growers effectively.  
By 2005, coca cultivation levels had risen to pre-Plan Dignidad levels.  This chapter 
describes this course of events, arguing that the failure of the government to consolidate 
its gains in the Chapare was the result of its strategic misstep (the push into the Yungas), 
rather than the inevitable result of a strategy of forced eradication. 
A. THE PUSH INTO THE YUNGAS: 2001 
 In late 2000, members of the Banzer administration met with U.S. Ambassador  to 
Bolivia Manuel Rocha to discuss where Plan Dignidad stood on its timeline.  During this 
gathering, a proposition was offered wherein a plan with a similar strategy as Plan 
Dignidad should be “considered” for the Yungas.  At this time, the proposition was only 
a suggestion and in such early stages of consideration that the Bolivian government still 
needed to create a timeline, calculate how much money that strategy would cost and 
discern how much of that cost the United States would be able to cover.  The tentative 
chronology of the plan, which did not include using the military until possibly the last 
phase, was as follows: 
Phase I.  Oct – Dec 01.  The Bolivian government would send an advisory 
group to encourage, advise, and sell the proposal to leaders in the Yungas.  
U.S. AID assistance and a payment plan for cooperation, which involved 
the same trimester monetary assistance plan as in the Chapare, would be 
offered. 
Phase II.  Jan – Mar 02.  Logistic and service support sites would be built 
to provide information assistance to Yunga growers. 






Phase IV.  Jul – Sep 02.  Considerations regarding the implementation of a 
forced eradication strategy would take place.71 
1.  Why the Push into the Yungas Failed 
 The plan was initially placed on hold while both governments deliberated what it 
would take to bring about a second successful and sustainable eradication policy, this one 
to the Yungas.  A series of events within the Banzer administration in 2001, however, led 
the government to move into the Yungas ahead of the schedule detailed in the plan and 
without following the phases detailed above. 
In 2001, Banzer was diagnosed with lung cancer which would lead him to eventually 
resign in August 2001, when he was succeeded by Vice President Quiroga.  Prior to this, 
while Banzer was undergoing medical treatment, Quiroga ran the presidency.  Quiroga 
was the mastermind behind the aggressive Plan Dignidad strategy and was constantly 
praised by the international community for the immediate progress “his” strategy 
brought.  In addition, two very important government positions, the ministry of 
agriculture and the ministry of government, which had played an intimate role in the 
planning, implementation, and execution of Plan Dignidad, underwent devastating 
changes. Both these key positions were refilled with persons who had had very little 
contact and experience with the complex relationship between the government and coca 
growers.72 
 Encouraged by the success of Plan Dignidad in the Chapare region, and perhaps 
motivated by a desire to demonstrate “political will” in anticipation of the 2002 
presidential elections, the government announced in March 2001 that it would shift its 
attention and eradication efforts to include the Yungas.73  In June 2001, the Bolivian 
administration moved its military to destroy the 1,700 hectares of excess coca in the  
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region.74    The results of that decision would eventually put the government in a 
compromising position, consequently causing Bolivia to lose ground in the progress it 
had made toward the eradication of coca. 
 The decision was a disaster because the government did not follow its own 
tentative plan: it completely skipped the first three and ultimately more important phases, 
plunging directly into the last phase, which called for the possibility of deploying a 
security force.  This demonstrated the failure of the new administration members to 
understand the critical underpinnings of Plan Dignidad – a public relations campaign and 
negotiations with cocaleros.  Additionally, although most Bolivians disagreed with 
aggressive counterdrug strategies, Plan Dignidad was working and had enjoyed public 
support75 because it had targeted the region known for its illicit cultivation.  The Yungas, 
however, was legally protected, and moving into it required a more diplomatic approach.  
Kathryn Ledebur, an analyst and scholar who has studied and worked in Bolivia 
advocating against aggressive counterdrug policies for some time, stated that, “This 
attempt to eradicate coca in the traditionally legal zone [Yungas] diminished public 
support for Plan Dignidad as the Bolivian people expressed frustration with shifting 
parameters for compliance with anti-drug goals.”76  Plainly, the decision to send security 
forces to the Yungas was an impetuous and misguided one. 
As a result, the eradication forces that moved into the Yungas that June found 
themselves surrounded by thousands of campesinos.  The paradigm adopted in the 
Chapare could not work in the Yungas because the region enjoyed partial protection 
under Law 1008 which authorized parcels of coca to be grown for the national market.  
Since the Yungas region had no defined areas where legal coca was to be grown, the 
majority of the Yungas population grew coca and attempted to blanket itself under the 
12,000 hectares authorized by the law.  In addition, the government had failed to engage 
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in the informational meetings and negotiations necessary to adapt the program to regional 
circumstances and make it palatable to the local population. 
The standoff between coca grower leaders in the Yungas and the government 
ended with the Bolivian government promising never again to seek forced eradication in 
the Yungas.  Gamarra states that the “… agreement [that] was signed in which the 
[Bolivian] government pledged to never forcefully eradicate coca in the Yungas… 
probably… averted a bloodbath. At the same time, however, it also signaled a turning of 
the tide against Plan Dignidad that would have an impact on the Chapare campaign.”77  
Indeed, the failed attempt only served to embolden and galvanize cocaleros from the 
Chapare.  After the Yungas event, the government returned to the Chapare only to face a 
more determined cocalero coalition, as protests and demonstrations became more 
common and more violent. 
B. FALLOUT IN THE CHAPARE 
Cocaleros in the Chapare saw the government’s failure in the Yungas as an 
opportunity to force the government to cease forced eradication and to demilitarize their 
region.  The eradication campaign, which had met with relatively little violence until this 
point, saw a significant increase in hostilities after the government’s failed push into the 
Yungas in June 2001.  The Chapare region witnessed an upsurge in violent incidents 
between the government and coca growers78 as “cocaleros took a more assertive stance 
against U.S.-funded militarized eradication in mid-September 2001 by surrounding 
eradication camps and blocking troops’ access to replanted coca fields…Tensions in the 
region increased throughout September.”79  During the post-Yungas demonstration in the 
Chapare from August 2001 to January 2002, “the high levels of violence and unrest 
spiraled…[and] there was an average of one death a week and one detainee and two 
wounded per day.”80  In 2000, there had been two fatalities and seventy-two injured coca 
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growers; in 2001, those numbers increased to seven fatalities and 193 injured.  By 2002, 
five more died and 145 more coca growers were injured.  The increase in violence is 
clearly documented in Table 2.     
 Peasants now began to demand from the government that each family be allowed 
to retain a cato (1,600 square metres) of coca bushes for traditional use.81  By the end of 
October, the government threatened to push additional forces to the Chapare, and coca 
growers in the region responded by saying that they would “use all weapons at their 
disposal, including dynamite to defend their crops.”82  The rate of eradication in the 
Chapare slowed (although a total of 9,395 hectares were eradicated in the region during 
2001).   Chapare growers began a “massive illegal replanting [which] led to increased 
coca cultivation.”83  By the end of 2001, coca cultivation in Bolivia had increased to 
almost 20,000 hectares from 14,600 in 2000.  By June 2002, coca cultivation had 
increased by 23 percent from the previous year.84  (See Table 3)  
 
 
Table 3.   Bolivia Cultivation & Eradication Statistics 1995-2002. 
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Furthermore, the state failed to close 15 illicit markets in the Chapare and 
prosecute violators who continued to grow and sell illicit coca.85  Responding to pressure 
from cocaleros, the government released several individuals detained for violating a 
government decree that threatened arrest and prosecution to individuals involved in 
transporting illegal coca from the Chapare. 
Increased protest in the Chapare was also likely fueled by the failure of the 
government to ensure that alternative development worked in the region.  It fell short of 
providing enough economic resources to make up for the deficit in family incomes.  For a 
number of peasants, growing coca greatly supplements their already low family-income.  
And although the success of the plan brought further funding for alternative development, 
the impact of the program was very slow paced, and in 2001 “only about 12,000 of the 
total 35,000 coca-growing families benefited, not just from USAID, but also from all 
alternative development projects combined.”86  While the 2001 INCSR report provides 
somewhat higher numbers – claiming that as of September 30, 2001, “More than 16,167 
farm families in 298 farmer organizations [we]re receiving alternative development 
assistance in the Chapare…”87  – it remains that another 19,000 families failed to receive 
their share of alternative development funding or supplemental assistance. 
By June 2002, a year after the attempted move into the Yungas, the government 
had not only lost control of the Chapare region but it also faced broader national 
dissatisfaction with its counterdrug policies as peasants from the Chapare began to rally 
in masses, blocking entrances to the capital city of La Paz.  In response, the government 
“made broad concessions to cocaleros in order to maintain its legitimacy within Bolivia 
and to improve its political standing for the June 30 elections.”88 
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C. THE SANCHEZ DE LOZADA ADMINISTRATION (2002-2003) 
 In August 2002, Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada was elected president, having 
promised during his campaign to demilitarize the Chapare and stop forced eradication.  It 
is not clear that Sanchez de Lozada intended to keep these promises; once in office, he 
continued with the status quo, enforcing Plan Dignidad with very little flexibility despite 
the recent turn of events. 
 Constant clashes between security forces and Chapare growers led to a three-and-
a-half month dialogue beginning in September 2002 between the government and coca 
harvesters.  Cocaleros demanded a temporary suspension of forced eradication to allow 
for the dialogue and demilitarizing of the Chapare coca-growing region.  Sanchez de 
Lozada rejected a pause in eradication, arguing that it was the law, but he stated that he 
might be willing to change Law 1008 to allow coca production for families in the 
Chapare.89  Cocaleros further requested an objective study of legal coca consumption and 
markets and a reevaluation of alternative development.  The cocaleros said they would 
respect the results of the study:  if the demand for coca was greater, then they should be 
allowed to grow the additional amount; if demand called for less coca, growers agreed to 
eradicate freely.  The dialogue partially worked, but the key points of contention were not 
resolved. 
 Sanchez de Lozada was encouraged to maintain tough counterdrug policies by the 
United States.  During a November 2002 visit to Washington: 
President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada warned President Bush that while 
he would push ahead with coca eradication plans, he needed more money 
to soften the impact on farmers. If he did not get that, he cautioned, he  
would be back next year—seeking political asylum.  He received only a 
fraction of the aid he requested. Today he is living in exile in the United 
States after a popular uprising.90 
 
 Sanchez de Lozada erred in going to President Bush as his actions were 
interpreted by Bolivians as going to President Bush to ask for permission to pause 
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eradication and not, as was intended, to request for help.  As a result, coca growers drove 
this point to the public, undermining Sanchez de Lozada’s credibility in Bolivia.  
Furthermore, Sanchez de Lozada’s request to ease off on eradication was something that 
President Bush would not understand because the U.S. president was far removed from 
the realities of the situations on the ground.  For this reason, many believe that pressure 
from the U.S. prevented Sanchez de Lozada from keeping his campaign promise to stop 
eradication and caused him to continue to push for eradication of coca as laid out in Plan 
Dignidad. 
Sanchez de Lozada may also have been motivated by a fear that demilitarizing the 
Chapare would open the gates for the return of the powerful cartels.  During the Sanchez 
de Lozada administration, the former Drug Czar of Bolivia was asked for his thoughts on 
the plans to demilitarize the Chapare.  The former Drug Czar explained that during the 
presidency of Virgilio Barco, former president to Colombia during the late 80s, Barco’s 
initiative to remove the cartels from the county was so successful that it drove those same 
cartels to migrate to neighboring countries such as Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia because 
those states were weak and easy to manipulate.  Prior to the cartel migration, Bolivia only 
produced coca paste. The cartels taught Bolivians how to make hydrochloride, a purer 
form of cocaine, all while the Chapare enjoyed zero security presence.  Therefore, the 
Drug Czar added, demilitarizing the Chapare zone could prove devastating if major 
cartels, perhaps even the FARC, again begin to populate and control that region.  He 
concluded that this was a frightening thought because, if Mexico, for example, which has 
more established institutions and legal system than Bolivia, was having a challenging 
time controlling their own cartel problem, then it would be a terrifying experience for 
Bolivia.91  It is unclear how much this meeting impacted on the decision to maintain 
security forces in the Chapare, but it is true that Sanchez de Lozada never followed up on 
his promise to remove military forces from the Chapare 
The Chapare growers returned to the streets on January 13, 2003.  The 
government responded with military forces, which resulted in the deaths of eleven 
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people.  A new dialogue took place on January 18, 2003, this time with President 
Sanchez de Lozada present at the negotiation table.  One of the leading figures 
negotiating with the government was Morales.  The four issues of contention were:  (1) 
demilitarization of the Chapare coca-growing region; (2) modification of anti-drug Law 
1008; (3) creation of an objective study of legal coca consumption and markets; (4) a 
break in eradication.92  The government rejected all these requests, attempting to 
postpone actions by promising other offers such as “… to make alternative development 
efforts more sustainable and participatory. Other offers [included] improvements in 
economic growth, health care, housing and infrastructure for basic services… The 
government also [planned] to accelerate efforts to give Chapare residents legal titles to 
their land.”93 
In October 2003, Sanchez de Lozada resigned after a series of demonstrations and 
protests calling for the President to step down from office.  Although a portion of the 
indigenous population resented his U.S.-backed counterdrug policy,94 it was not the coca 
growers from either the Chapare or Yungas who pushed him out of office.  His forced 
resignation had to do more with a combination of factors: (1) how badly the economy 
affected the poorer sectors of society, (2) the government’s project for a gas pipeline to 
run through Chile; and (3) the government’s use of force in repressing strikes and 
demonstrations.  First, Bolivians in general were unhappy with neoliberal economic 
policies that were perceived as not benefiting the citizens.  This dissatisfaction predated 
Sanchez de Lozada’s administration, and he inherited months of protests, strikes, and 
“road blockages that resulted in up to 80 deaths in confrontations with government 
troops”95 that continued to take place during his term.  But the protest activities were 
exacerbated by Sanchez de Lozada’s decision to raise taxes on the poor and cut social 
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spending.  In addition, the Bolivian peasants became even more angered by the 
requirements the International Monetary Fund was placing on Bolivia. 
Second, a proposal by Sanchez de Lozada to export natural gas via a pipeline that 
would run through Chile undermined his presidency.  The “… decision by the Sánchez 
government to permit the export of Bolivian natural gas by transnational companies was 
the spark for the protests that led to the president’s resignation in October 2003.”96  The 
decision was particularly controversial because Bolivians still resent Chile for taking its 
coastal department of Litoral after defeating Bolivia in the War of the Pacific in 1879, 
thus denying the country any access to the sea. 
The final event that led to Sanchez de Lozada’s resignation took place in October 
2003 when he made a decision that showed preferential treatment. It began when Edwin 
Huampo, a close friend of Felipe Quispe, leader of the United Trade Union 
Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia (CSUTCB), was arrested and sentenced for 
stealing cattle.  Another individual who was arrested for the same crime was 
subsequently released after the Sanchez administration intervened in his favor.  This 
incident led Quispe to call for a hunger strike demanding the release of Huampo.  Despite 
hundreds of peasants going on strike, the government did not release Huampo.  Quispe’s 
followers also forcibly detained a group of tourists in Huarisata by not letting them leave 
the hotel in which they were staying.  The international community intervened, 
demanding the Bolivian government do something about the tourists’ plight.  The 
government sent the military to free the group.  Peasant workers reacted by attacking the 
military convoy, resulting in the deaths of some civilians. 
Peasant workers responded to the government’s tough approach by setting up 
road blocks on La Paz’s four major highways that lead into the city.  The roadblocks 
successfully blocked La Paz from receiving many necessities such as gas, basic foods, 
and medical supplies.  The government set up convoys to bring these items into the city, 
but in El Alto, a town right outside La Paz, a military convoy was attacked and more 
people died.  After this event, Sanchez de Lozada resigned from office.  Therefore, it was 
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actually the peasants from the Alti Plano, La Paz, who forced Sanchez de Lozada to 
resign and for Bolivians to demand a constitutional assembly. 97 
 In sum, Sanchez de Lozada’s 15-month long presidency was not guided by any 
clear counterdrug policy.  Instead, as during his first presidential administration, “his 
emphasis was on the economy [and] so he did not personally involve himself too much 
on the counterdrug front.”98  In fact, he rarely met with coca leaders or visited the 
Chapare, whereas Banzer had been seen regularly in those areas, showing an interest in 
how everything was evolving.  This lack of grand strategy and the increased and 
unprecedented international assistance (and pressure) Bolivia was receiving led Sanchez 
de Lozada to administer the status quo half-heartedly at a time when drug control policies 
needed to be either modified or vigorously defended and enforced. 
D. THE MESA ADMINISTRATION (2003-2005) 
 With Sanchez de Lozada’s resignation in October 2003, Vice President Carlos 
Mesa became the interim President of Bolivia. He spent his first year in office appealing 
to the conglomerate campesinos from the Alti Plano, which included a very small 
percentage of coca growers, because it had been they who brought down Sanchez de 
Lozada. 
 In regards to counterdrug strategy, Mesa did not have a strategy and spent most of 
his time reacting to events rather than planning for and anticipating them.  Coca growers 
continued to push for modifications of Law 1008, an end to forced eradication, and the 
demilitarization of the Chapare.  Mesa proved to be reluctant to use military force to 
break up protests in the Chapare out of fear of the political consequences, which had 
already contributed to bringing down previous administrations, and this reluctance 
weakened his position.  His administration characteristically stalled any efforts toward a  
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resolution on coca grower issues that needed resolution, until a decision absolutely had to 
be made—and then he felt he had no other choice but to succumb to the coca growers to 
rid himself of the problem 
This was the case in October 2004 when President Carlos Mesa, Morales and 
other growers arrived at an agreement that ameliorated the tension between the 
government and growers that had been fomenting since 2001.  The agreement favored the 
cocaleros and ceded to them the majority of their demands. The agreement allowed 
Chapare citizens to grow 3,200 hectares of coca legally for one year (one cato per 
family); in return, the growers promised to destroy roughly 3,000 hectares.  Legal coca 
crops were sold to intermediaries licensed by the government drug agency, which 
controlled the two legal coca markets.99  The one cato was to provide a family with a 
secure income of $70 to $110 monthly, which was intended as a safety net while 
alternative development programs were put into place.  The excess harvest would be 
subject to voluntary eradication, rather than forced eradication.100 
The government stopped its forceful eradication of coca and agreed to conduct the 
activity jointly with families.  Since security forces and coca growers understood the 
legal amount of coca permitted by the new agreement, families would designate which 
cato they chose to keep, and the government would eradicate the rest.  Cooperative 
eradication, as it came to be called by the government, was seen by the cocaleros as 
gaining one more demand in their favor. 
 Another agreement reached with President Mesa involved the authorization of a 
legal market study of coca.  Cocaleros had argued that there was a higher demand for 
coca than the 12,000 hectares that Law 1008 allowed.  Growers stipulated that the market 
study should be conducted by a disinterested party.  The United States or the Bolivian 
government could not lead the study, and everyone conceded that the Europe Union 
should be responsible for conducting the study.  According to the president of a cocalero 
labor union, “Studies of the market for legal uses of coca leaves will show [them] how 
much is necessary for traditional and medicinal consumption of the plant.  That could 
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signify the need to modify Law 1008 because it could lead to an increase in the number 
of hectares on which cultivation is authorized.”101 
 In sum, the Mesa administration ultimately gave in to coca grower demands 
because it was the only way for the government to gain some control over the unending 
protests, riots, and road blockages that affected the economy.  According to the 2005 
INSCR: 
Political challenges to democratic governance in Bolivia severely limited 
the ability of the Government of Bolivia (GOB) to curb dramatic increases 
of coca cultivation in the Yungas. The besieged Mesa Administration, at 
times, seemed more concerned with containing possible confrontations 
with cocaleros through negotiation and concessions than with the 
consistent application of the rule of law. It also failed to give political 
support to GOB programs advocating drug prevention and to undertake an 
effective social communication program to explain the dangers that excess 
coca production, drug production and consumption pose to Bolivian 
society. 102 
E. IMPACT ON CULTIVATION (2001-2005) 
 Between 2001 and 2005, coca cultivation increased by 33 percent in Bolivia while 
eradication decreased by 36 percent.  (See Table 4)   The Sanchez de Lozada and Mesa 
administration were incapable of regaining the lost momentum. 
   
 
  
Table 4.   Bolivia Cultivation and Eradication Statistics 2001-2006. 
                                                 
101 Ledebur, “Coca and Conflict in the Chapare,” 2. 






 Modest efforts to eradicate at least the minimum international requirements were 
being attempted, but overall Bolivia’s coca cultivation would continue to return to 
previous high numbers, and more significantly, Bolivian cocaleros had regained the 
moral high ground of the issue, diminishing the likelihood of aggressive eradication 
policies in the future. 
F. CONCLUSION 
 Plan Dignidad was initially a stunning success.  It virtually eliminated coca 
cultivation in the Chapare and drastically reduced the overall cultivation of coca in 
Bolivia to numbers never before achieved.  The Plan’s main achievement came from 
implementing forced eradication and militarizing the Chapare region.  Despite the social 
tensions caused by stationing the armed forces in the Chapare region, the significant 
increase in violence and human rights violations took place only after the government 
attempted to eradicate coca in the Yungas.  The peasants in the Yungas were able to 
revolt successfully in part because the law permitted coca to be grown in the Yungas, 
whereas in Chapare it was illegal.  The government had been successful in its public 
relations campaign surrounding the Chapare, in part because the illegality of growing 
coca in the Chapare meant that they had no allies outside the region.  In addition, the 
government failed to lay any of the public relations groundwork as they had done in the 
Chapare, leaping immediately to the militarized phase four of the plan.  The peasants 
were able to not only push back eradication forces, but also to convince the government 
to promise never to forcefully eradicate coca in the Yungas area.  This agreement 
encouraged the Chapare to rally against the government in the same fashion in order to 
accomplish similar goals.  The effect in Chapare was similar to that of the Yungas: the 
government gave the demands of the cocaleros. 
Sanchez de Lozada entered office on the wrong foot after breaking his campaign 
promise to demilitarize the Chapare and end forced eradication.  Although his stern 
approach to upholding Plan Dignidad caused much dissent among coca growers, Sanchez 
de Lozada’s resignation was not directly due to the cocaleros’ uprising, but from a 
combination of his taking the wrong approach to a dire situation and the Bolivians’ 





avoided the coca problem in the Chapare as much as possible and made very few efforts 
to come up with a resolution; having no strategy and wishing to rid himself of the 
cocalero problem, he gave in to demands by coca growers.  As a result, during the period 
































IV. THE ADMINISTRATION OF EVO MORALES (2006-
PRESENT) 
 Coca grower federations across Bolivia exert tremendous influence on Bolivia’s 
polity.  It was the cocaleros who in 2001 demonstrated and conducted roadblocks that 
prompted the government to concede to their demands and played a part in forcing 
Sanchez de Lozada from the presidency.  In December 2005, Evo Morales, the leader of a 
cocalero union from the Chapare region, rose to the Bolivian presidency on a radical 
platform calling for an end to coca eradication and the abolition of Law 1008.  Once in 
office, Morales continued his rhetoric about the sacredness and importance of the coca 
leaf to the peasantry, slowed eradication efforts to minimal international requirements, 
and pushed the international community to accept industrial uses of the coca leaf.  He 
changed many of the provisions of Law 1008 through presidential decrees, though he has 
refrained from revoking the law.  At the same time, he has promised to step up 
interdiction efforts to prevent the production and trafficking of cocaine. 
 In many ways, Morales’ administration confirms the academic wisdom about the 
reasons Latin American governments will not implement tough counterdrug policies. 
First, Morales views drugs as a U.S. problem and believes that the United States should 
control its internal demand for drugs. Second, under Plan Dignidad, eradication caused a 
3% drop in the gross domestic product (GDP), which Bolivia can ill afford and which 
Morales hopes to recoup.103  Third, as a former cocalero leader, it is no surprise that 
Morales would be receptive to the demands of this pressure group.  Finally, while his 
administration is susceptible to international pressure, this is only enough to generate 
minimal compliance with counternarcotic requirements.  Despite the explanatory power 
of these four factors, an understanding of Morales “grand strategy” remains important for 
assessing Morales’ counterdrug policies.  For example, Morales has a vision to transform 
the role of coca through industrialization, which requires a lax counterdrug strategy.  In 
addition, Morales’ grand strategy for Bolivia’s development emphasizes hydrocarbons 
and constitutional reforms, leaving counterdrug policies in a secondary plane that allows 
                                                 





some room for negotiation with the United States.  This grand strategy also requires a 
level of international cooperation that motivates a greater level of pragmatism in the 
government’s counterdrug strategy than one might expect from a former cocalero leader.           
 This chapter will also address the growing debacle over the effectiveness and 
sustainability of Morales’ counterdrug policies.  While Morales’ policies may not match 
U.S. preferences, some analysts believe that his close ties to the coca growers may place 
him in a position to adopt effective counterdrug measures that are acceptable to his coca 
growing constituency.  Morales’ policy of cooperative eradication, they argue, could 
achieve their objectives while preventing human rights violations and being sustainable. 
In 2005, the United Nations offered numbers that indicate voluntary eradication has been 
successful.  Conversely, critics of Morales argue that his policies are ineffective as they 
lead to the increase of coca cultivation and drug traffickers’ increased interest in Bolivia 
due to its growing availability of coca.  Thus, ineffectual policies such as these only serve 
to tip the scale in favor of traffickers, making it inconsequential to sustain such policies.  
This chapter shows that the latter position is more credible. 
A. MORALES’ PRESIDENTIAL PLATFORM 
 Evo Morales played a significant role during the negotiations with the previous 
administrations which ended in a successful resolution to many of the cocaleros’ 
demands.  Before reaching the presidency, Morales’ tone was clear and resolute, calling 
for immediate government satisfaction of cocalero demands.  On January 21, 2003, for 
example, he “threatened to launch a campaign to unseat the government if it [did] not 
respond quickly to the demands of coca farmers manning a roadblock on the country’s 
main highway for the past week.”104  When President Sanchez de Lozada requested 
demonstrators to disband and return back to negotiations with the government, Morales 
and a large conglomeration of unions said “they would take even more radical measures 
if the government failed to respond to their demands….”105  Morales’ reactions as a 
cocalero leader were forceful and called for immediate responses, and his unbending 
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persistence to resolve the issues affecting cocaleros made it appear that, once in office, 
his first priority would be to address and resolve, once and for all, the coca conundrum.  
Based on his radical requests as a presidential candidate, it would not be surprising to see 
Morales as President completely throw out Law 1008 and remove coca from the list of 
controlled substances within Bolivia.  In March 2004, Morales, as a congressman, was 
trying to pass legislation that clarified that Law 1008 did not require forced 
eradication.106 
It is important to note that counterdrug policy was only one of many issues on 
which Morales was elected.  Despite the claim by some that Plan Dignidad was the 
driving force to bringing Morales to power, Clare Ribando suggests there were additional 
factors “…that may have led to his victory includ[ing] the perception that pro-market 
economic reforms had not benefited the majority of the Bolivian population; the 
corruption of the traditional parties that had ruled since 1982; and the tough, nationalistic 
positions he has taken against foreign investors.”107  The reality is that the Bolivian 
people wanted a change.  They felt that previous governments were not looking out for 
what was best for the country.  Morales also campaigned on this note, which summarizes 
his own grand strategy of economic and social development by reducing poverty and 
racial discrimination,108 carrying out land reform, and securing higher revenues for 
Bolivia from the extraction of its natural resources. 
 As a result, coca has not been the foremost issue on Morales’ policy agenda.  
Instead, the new president has spent his time and influence addressing issues of land 
reform and the “nationalization” of Bolivia’s oil and gas sectors.  By consenting to coca 
growers, his base support, Morales is “buying social peace.”109  Meanwhile, it is also 
important for Morales to deliver to his own constituency because, after all, it is they who 
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brought him to power.  So although Morales’ priorities, again, fall more in line with 
nationalizing the country’s natural resources and land reform, he must continue to play 
out his defiance against those who push for aggressive counterdrug strategies. 
B. MORALES AS PRESIDENT 
 Once in office, Morales revealed his fourfold drug control agenda: to eliminate 
forced eradication and implement cooperative eradication (later termed “Rationalization” 
by the Morales administration); to focus on interdiction as the main plank of drug control 
efforts; to conduct an independent study to discover whether there was a market for the 
sale of coca; and to review the alternative development program, investment in 
infrastructures, and promotion of small businesses.  Morales does not promise a policy of 
“zero coca.”  Instead, the slogan is “coca yes, cocaine no.”  This is to indicate that the 
fight is not against peasants planting the crop, but against drug traffickers who use coca 
to make cocaine.  He seeks to differentiate between coca as a plant and cocaine, the 
illegal drug.110    As a result, he argues that the demand for cocaine also needs to be 
addressed: “Morales' approach to the coca issue is that the cocaine problem should be 
solved on the consumption side, not by eradicating the coca plantations and by sending 
more military into the coca-growing regions.”111  Morales hopes to extend the 
cooperative approach to coca-growing areas outside the Chapare without the social 
conflicts that have taken place in the past.  Interdiction efforts and targeting money 
laundering and corruption are prioritized over eradication efforts, all while recognizing 
“…the cultural, religious, health and other positive attributes of the coca leaf.”112  The 
endstate of his strategy is the industrialization of coca for licit uses. 
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C. COOPERATIVE ERADICATION: AN EFFECTIVE AND SUSTAINABLE 
APPROACH? 
 Many believe that Morales’ policy of cooperative eradication is promising and 
could finally bring positive results on the War on Drugs: “As a coca grower himself, 
President Morales has an unprecedented opportunity to devise a drug control strategy that 
enjoys significant support within the country, and that could achieve the kind of durable 
results that have proven so elusive.”113  His prominence with the cocaleros gives him an 
advantage for negotiating with the local peasants and reaching promising agreements.  
His administration is already engaged in dealing with local coca unions to identify areas 
that need to be eradicated.  In the Yungas, for example, the government has been able to 
strike deals with Yungas’ representatives; cocaleros in La Sunta, Yungas, agreed to 
eradicate between 1,000 – 1,500 hectares in exchange for 11 million dollars of alternative 
development.114   
 The process of eliminating coca crops, however, has become more bureaucratic 
than action driven.  Hence, the number of hectares under cultivation seems to be 
increasing rather than decreasing.  According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime in 2006, Bolivia’s “… coca cultivation rose eight percent to 27,500 hectares, due 
to increases in the main cultivation regions, Yungas of La Paz and Chapare.”115    By the 
end of 2006, Bolivia had eradicated 5,070 hectares of coca, surpassing its goal of 5,000 
hectares by only 70 hectares of coca.116  This compares unfavorably with the 6,073 and 
8,437 hectares eradicated in 2005 and 2004, respectively. 
Morales’ cooperative eradication efforts have been undermined by a number of 
concessions he made to cocaleros upon assuming office.  He expanded to every coca 
growing family in Bolivia the right to grow at least one “cato” of coca; President Mesa 
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had extended this right only to families in the Yungas.  In June 2006, Morales announced 
a new ministerial resolution that states that coca will no longer be controlled, but will be 
cultivated for health, culture, and nutrition.  According to Law 1008, coca can be sold 
only in two government-controlled markets, in La Paz and Cochabamba.  Under the new 
resolution, however, any licensed vendor can cultivate, transport, and sell coca. 
Law 1008 stipulates that excess coca that has been seized from persons will be 
burned in order to prevent it from being used to make cocaine.  The new ministerial 
resolution, however, undermines this mandate by requiring that excess coca be auctioned 
instead of burned.  Furthermore, Law 1008 is also clear that all undocumented coca leaf 
will be confiscated by the Bolivian drug task force unit, the organization responsible for 
the control of the legal transportation of coca.  The published Ministerial Resolution 
states that a percentage of illegal coca seized from a person will be returned to the 
violator.  The person responsible will not be subject to any formal legal proceedings; the 
violator’s punishment, instead, is to lose forty percent of the coca on the first infraction, 
sixty percent on the second infraction, and the entire amount the third time. 
 The Ministerial Resolution was a smart way for Morales to accomplish his 
objective while not overturning Law 1008.  It demonstrates how Morales does not intend 
to follow U.S. sought policies.  Although the ultimate goal is for Law 1008 to be 
overturned, this is very unlikely to happen because Morales’ party lacks the necessary 
votes in the senate and because the United States and Europe would likely object.  Still, 
Morales is working on draft legislation to revise Law 1008.  The change would be to 
allow an increase of up to 20,000 from the current 12, 000 hectares for cultivation, an 
additional 8,000 for the Chapare for coca growth.  The proposal stipulates that eventually 
the 20,000 hectares would go down to 16,000 hectares.117  The Ministerial Resolution  
helps Morales gain political support from his constituency base, but it  
completely undermines coca eradication efforts. 
 Interdiction under President Morales has been reasonably successful, but not 
dramatically different from the successes of previous administrations.  This is to say that 
                                                 






Morales’ interdiction overall has been reasonably successful, but not sufficient.  The 
credit goes mainly to the counternarcotic units who are effective, professional, and who 
have made some advances against corruption.118  Interdiction, since 2001, has strikingly 
gone up - increased amounts per seizures and more frequent seizures.  The Drug 
Enforcement Administration attributes this to four factors:  1. better intelligence; 2. better 
tactical operations; 3. Bolivia’s increased role as a cocaine transit route from Peru to 
Brazil and other Southern Cone countries; 4. an increase in coca leaf production.119  Coca 
cultivation is definitely out of control and has brought increased cocaine.  Families who 
were formerly never involved in narcotrafficking are now doing so, and their reasoning 
is, “I don’t care what they do with the coca, I’m just selling them leaves.”120  In an 
interview on November 7, 2006, U.S. Ambassador to Bolivia, Philip Goldberg, stated that 
the United States sees the eradication of coca as a pillar to controlling narco-trafficking; 
one cannot separate coca from cocaine, as Morales attempts to do, because more coca 
will help produce more cocaine.121 
 Since Morales came into office, interdiction statistics have increased from 2004-
2006.  In 2005 and 2006, seizures of cocaine/base exceeded 11 metric tons and 14 metric 
tons, respectively.122  Prior to 2006, each pit produced about one kilo of coca per day.  
Today, Bolivian producers employ the Colombian method which uses leaves that are still 
green, yielding two to three kilos per day per pit. In fact, between the twelfth and 
eighteenth of September, 2007, sixty-one labs were seized (each lab has between 1-3 pits) 
and a total of 81 pits were found in the Chapare.  In the area of Potosi, 30 kilos of cocaine 
were seized in 2006; during the first nine months of 2007, over a ton was captured.123   
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Intelligence has pointed out that a high influx of cartels, mostly Colombians and 
Mexicans, are beginning to show up in the Bolivian city of Santa Cruz; in that same city, 
an average of 156 kilos a month is seized.124 (See Table 5)  
   
Table 5.    Bolivia Seizure Statistics 2001-20006 
  
 Morales’ policy is incoherent because he wants social peace in his base and sees a 
key role for coca in Bolivia society and economy.  At the same time, he cannot have 
unlimited coca—because it affects him internationally and domestically, where crime 
rates are increasing as a result of increased cocaine production.  In addition, problems 
with drug use in Bolivia are increasing; according to the 2006 INCSR, “Bolivia’s own 
                                                 






consumption of cocaine products now approaches levels of use in the United States, when 
measured in terms of users as a percentage of population.”125 
 Interestingly, although prior to the election, Morales’ political platform was one 
of solving problems without death and injury to society, he has not been able to make this 
platform work, and protests end up in violence and claim the lives of participants as 
well.126  On September 29, 2006, during Morales term as president, two coca growers 
were killed during a confrontation between security forces and coca growers.127  
President Morales, has continued to maintain the same number of military personnel in 
the region.  Today, as in 2001, there are 800 soldiers, 100 ecological police, 400 national 
police in Chimore, Cochabamba.128 
  
D. THE LEGAL COCA MARKET: APPEALING TO EUROPE AND LATIN 
AMERICAN ALLIES 
 Bolivia is a country that heavily relies on external aid and loans for a large portion 
of its budget.129  The United States and European Union are huge donors of money to 
Bolivia, but happen to believe in different approaches to fighting the drug problem in the 
region.130  A president’s grand strategy guides how he will deal with each international 
actor, specifically the European Union and the United States.  Bolivia receives significant 
amounts of money from both the European Union and the United States; but how much 
influence do the EU and the United States truly have over Bolivia?  A review of the 
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expectation, policies, and requirements of each external actor can help one to better 
understand why Morales’ grand strategy is framed around cooperation with the European 
Union.  Despite this, he continues to meet the minimum requirements of the United States 
and seeks $598 million dollars through the U.S. State Department’s Millennium 
Challenge Account for infrastructure development and small/medium business 
promotion. 
European Union programs in Bolivia are designed to help the government 
strengthen institutions, infrastructure, education, and indigenous integration.  The 
European Union emphasizes alternative development as the primary means to fight the 
cultivation of excess coca destined for the production of cocaine.  Although the EU does 
express a need for eradication, it is not as concerned with eradication as the United 
States.  More recently, the European Union countries have grown concerned about “the 
lack of improvement in eradication and alternative development”131 efforts by the 
Bolivian government.132 
 As one of the leading providers of financial aid to Bolivia, Europe can wield 
significant leverage on Bolivia’s counterdrug policy.  The European Union provides 
roughly 324 million euro annually (equivalent to approximately 469 million dollars) of 
total assistance to the country, second only to the aid the U.S. provides to Colombia.133  
About 53 percent of the assistance from Europe is disbursed by the European Union in 
financial, technical, and economic cooperation involving regional physical integration, 
alternative development, water sanitation, food security, disaster management, etc.  The 
rest of the aid is channeled by member states that contribute funding for a variety of 
programs including administrative and judicial reform, civil society, rural development, 
health and child care programs, water sanitation projects, and education. 134 
Morales’ move to nationalize the gas industry gained Bolivia substantial influence 
in the European Union.  After Morales’ victory, Morales was invited to Europe to address 
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concerns about his nationalization plans.  Morales signaled that he would allow foreign 
investors to continue to manage and run Bolivia’s hydrocarbon industry and that they 
would also continue to see profit, but that Bolivia would now be asking for a higher 
percentage payback from previous times.  Although many European countries made 
conciliatory gestures such as forgiving the Bolivian debt, Morales insisted that 
nationalization will occur and explained what that process meant to foreign investors.  He 
asserted that “foreign companies would see returns on their investments, but as partners, 
not owners.”135  Europe continues to cooperate with Bolivia in order to protect European 
foreign investors.  Since a good number of investors and private companies running 
Bolivian gas plants come from the European Union, this gives the new Morales’ 
administration a card to play.  Morales understands the leverage that he has in Europe, 
and he attempts to divert the attention from eradication of coca to resolving the dilemma 
of Europe’s foreign investment. 
 The European Union had already earmarked approximately 420,000 dollars to 
conduct a market study for the national demand of coca prior to Morales coming into 
office.  The European Union agreed to the study to determine how much coca should be 
allowed to be legally grown in the country.  Morales’ intentions are to industrialize coca 
and export the leaf.  Europe, however, does not support the industrialization of coca.136  
There are two main reasons why the industrialization of coca is not supported by the 
European Union:  first, coca leaf has been designated as a controlled substance by the 
United Nations; second, Europe (like the United States) believes the industrialization of 
coca would only generate greater quantities of cocaine.137 Nevertheless, the European 
Union’s Statistics National Institute is about to submit a proposal for the conduct of the 
study; the study will “begin this month [October 2007] and end 18 months later [which 
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Morales hopes] will vindicate his decision to increase this year's coca leaf  
production from 29,652 acres to 49,421 acres.”138  
Cocalero unions expect that after a market study has been conducted, the finding 
will allow them to expand their coca crops.  Many expect that products made from coca 
will be able to be exported to other countries.  Since industrialization is a major goal of 
the cocaleros, they push Morales to remove the coca leaf from the United Nation’s list of 
controlled substances.  If the survey calls for the harvest of less coca, Morales will face 
intense pressures from both external actors.  It will also hurt him politically, for it may 
undermine some support from the cocaleros. 
Morales is aligning with Venezuela and Cuba in an effort to show that those 
countries have a demand for products made of coca leaf.  In February 2007, Venezuelan 
president Chavez met with Morales in Caracas to finalize a trade deal on coca products 
between the two countries; Venezuela promised “…to buy whatever legal products 
Bolivia could make from coca leaf…”139  In addition to providing a market for coca 
products, Venezuela and Cuba have promised to provide technical support on the 
production and construction of Bolivia’s three factories for legal coca products, which are 
already underway. 140  By aligning himself with Venezuela and Cuba, regardless of what 
the European Union study shows, Morales will still be able to push for industrialization 
based on a market he created.  
E. THE UNITED STATES 
This only leaves the United States to push for eradication of the leaf, but the 
United States has little pull with Morales outside the Andean-U.S. Free Trade 
Agreement; threats of decertification are also futile because Morales intends to meet 
minimal requirements.  Morales wants to join the United States Free Trade Agreement 
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and continue to receive U.S. aid.  In order to appease the U.S., Morales will continue to 
negotiate with American officials.  On November 17, 2006, Morales told La Razon, a 
Bolivian newspaper, that any negotiations made with the United States would be done 
through talks and not through statements being exchanged through the press.141 
The U.S. government’s official position is that both governments should continue 
to be engaged with one another, and so cooperation continues at various levels.  
Nevertheless, the U.S. government grows concerned over the increasing negative rhetoric 
against the United States, which may cause a deterioration of relations in the future.  
Most significantly, relations may take a downward turn given the Bolivian government’s 
new ties with Iran.  Another U.S. concern, which may also affect bilateral relations, 
concerns the possibility of cartels beginning to move in and take larger control of the 
drug trade in Bolivia.  Interestingly enough, the U.S. Congress, in fact, just extended 
Bolivia’s antinarcotics assistance; as one government official noted, “because Morales 
has not failed demonstrably, the U.S. can’t decertify.”142  In the end, Morales does not 
want to be seen as weak or caving in to U.S. demands.  This leads the United States to 
approach Morales in chambers rather than in the public forum.  If agreements between 
the two countries are made and appear favorable to U.S. interests, these will not be made 
obvious to the coca growers for fear that Morales will be viewed as weak and betraying 
his own constituency. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Morales’ counterdrug policy is subservient to his grand strategy.  Relaxing the 
coca eradication policy, for example, is not only playing to his constituency, but also 
contributes economically by providing a secure income for coca growers.  This helps, at 
least in the short term, the poor receive some income; and, it sustains the respect for the 
sacred leaf, which is symbolic to the indigenous population.  This is consistent with the 
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“tough, nationalistic position,” he has taken to secure higher hydrocarbon revenues for 
Bolivia while also pushing for a land reform believed to benefit a larger pool of society. 
Morales is effectively balancing all of the actors who have an interest in Bolivia’s 
counterdrug policy.  The manner in which he balances between these pressures creates 
Bolivia’s current counterdrug policy.  The strongest groups he faces are Europe, United 
States, and the cocaleros.  Since Morales relies on the coca harvesters for political 
support, he tailors his rhetoric to them.  The October 2004 concessions granted coca 
harvesters many of their demands.  Morales’ Ministerial Resolution gave them the rest of 
what they wanted, without needing to overturn Law 1008.  As long as Law 1008 stays 
intact, Morales can assert to the United States that it is “business as usual.”  At the same 
time, the Morales administration continues to negotiate with the United States behind 
closed doors, while Morales takes stronger stands in public.  In the open forum, Morales 
is going in the complete opposite direction from where the U.S. wishes him to go.  Yet, it 
should not come as a surprise that Morales would check with and try to get a feel from 
the United States before adopting drastic law and measures, like introducing changes to 
be Law 1008.  International aid is crucial to Morales’ grand strategy, thus he deals with 
Europe by using “nationalization of natural resources” rhetoric.  Although the market 
study was the driving force to his proposed counterdrug policy during his campaign, he 
will benefit most if that study is prolonged. 
Meanwhile, Bolivia’s liberal coca policies contribute to an increase in the 
country’s coca cultivation, and thus create a lax environment for increased coca 
production.  On this, the facts speak for themselves:  cocaine/base production has 
significantly increased, resulting in a corollary increase of interdiction numbers by law 
enforcement.  Bolivia’s law enforcement accomplishments can be characterized as 
successful; experts point out that law enforcement in Bolivia has improved in areas of 
intelligence and tactical operations.  Unfortunately, the vast number of coca leaves 
available means even the most experienced and trained agency will be unable to capture a 
large portion of the drugs produced in the country.  Likewise, even the most experienced 
coca grower may not quite understand the international, and, most importantly, national 






 For the over thirty years, counterdrug policies in Latin America have been a 
prevailing topic among academics and policymakers.  Overall, Latin American countries 
and the United States continue to disagree on what is the right mix of policies needed for 
an effective and sustainable counterdrug strategy; hence, inconsistent and oscillating 
antinarcotics strategies usually are the result, as new presidents attempt to adopt their 
visions.  Scholars and policymakers have long battled over the correct approach; a myriad 
of proposals have been offered to those responsible for shaping and forming policies.  As 
this thesis has shown, however, the formulation and implementation of effective and 
sustainable drug control policies is not just a technical matter, but rather a deeply political 
process that goes beyond “knowing” the right mix of interdiction, eradication, and 
education.  Therefore, a better understanding of the politics behind both the formulation 
and implementation of drug control policies is fundamental for advances in the war on 
drugs.   This chapter reviews the thesis’ findings on the factors that shape the formulation 
and implementation of effective and sustainable drug control policies.  It then offers 
policy recommendations and suggestions for future research based on these findings.   
A. THE FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EFFECTIVE AND 
SUSTAINABLE DRUG CONTROL POLICIES 
This thesis has demonstrated that there are a number of factors that must be taken 
into consideration when trying to understand Latin America’s counterdrug policy.   
Academics typically identify four factors that work against the formulation and 
implementation of tough counterdrug policies:  (1) the view that the drug problem is 
primarily one of U.S. demand; (2) the central role of drugs in the economy; (3) pressures 
from domestic interest groups; and, (4) the inability of international pressure to secure 
anything more than superficial compliance.   In contrast, U.S. policymakers tend to stress 
that “political will” can overcome these obstacles and that it is the most important factor 
needed to gain ground in the War on Drugs.   
 The thesis argues instead that the formulation of counterdrug policy is shaped 





essence, a president will identify strategic goals for his or her administration and 
everything else will become subordinate to the overarching goal.  “Political will” is 
largely linked to this grand strategy; in addition, a president’s grand strategy shapes a 
government’s  views on the nature of the drug problem, its perception of the impact drugs 
have on  economic development, and its approach to handling domestic and international 
interest groups.   In the case of the Banzer administration, the president’s overall grand 
strategy was designed to create an economic, social, and political environment fertile for 
foreign investment.  All decisions Banzer made as president, in particular the adoption of 
Plan Dignidad, were in support of his grand strategy – to develop Bolivia economically 
and make it the center of energy in South America.  This required heavy foreign 
investment not only to build plants that would transform the gas into liquid gas, but also 
to build a pipeline through Chile that would facilitate shipment to California. For this 
vision to succeed, Banzer believed that Bolivia would need an image free from the 
stigmas of corruption, contraband, and narcotrafficking.  Banzer needed to implement 
policies that would  strengthen his country’s, as well as his own, credibility in the 
international forum, thus increasing the amount of foreign assistance to his country and, 
of course, gaining U.S. favorability and assistance in facilitating international loans and 
debt relief.   
   President Sanchez de Lozada, in contrast, had a grand strategy for the economy, 
but it was silent on the issue of coca cultivation and drug trafficking.  As a result, 
Sanchez de Lozada’s 15-month long presidency was not guided by any clear counterdrug 
policy.  Instead, as during his first presidential administration, “his emphasis was on the 
economy [and] so he did not personally involve himself too much on the counterdrug 
front.”143 This lack of a grand strategy and the increased and unprecedented international 
assistance (and pressure) Bolivia was receiving at the time led Sanchez de Lozada to 
administer the status quo half-heartedly during a period when drug control policies 
needed to be either modified or vigorously defended and enforced.  In contrast, President 
Mesa -- as an interim president faced with growing societal unrest -- lacked any kind of a 
                                                 
143 Personal interview with a former high-level Bolivian government official involved in the 





grand strategy.  As a result, he simply made concessions to interest groups in order to 
preserve social order.  Finally, President Morales has governed the country not so much 
as a single-issue former cocalero, but rather as a leader with a grand strategy for his 
country’s development.  Understanding the role of coca within this vision is important for 
understanding his drug control policies.   
 A second major argument of this thesis is that Plan Dignidad was not only an 
effective counterdrug plan but it also could have been sustainable, if not for the ill-fated 
push into the Yungas.   While it is impossible for analysts to ignore the early gains of 
Plan Dignidad in eradicating coca in the Chapare region, most view it as an unsustainable 
policy because it was based on forced eradication and the militarization of the region.   
On the contrary, this thesis shows that the success of Plan Dignidad was rooted in a 
systematic series of talks and  public relations campaigns to deal with coca growers 
during various phases of the strategy.  Most significantly, negotiations with leaders of 
peasant organizations appear to have been important in preventing an initial violent 
response to the government’s forced eradication efforts.   The Banzer government began 
negotiations with leaders of the coca federations over eliminating the compensation to 
individuals as an incentive for eradication and, subsequently, introduced new community 
incentives, instead.   As a result, the implementation of Plan Dignidad in the Chapare was 
met with far less societal resistance and violence than most analysts had predicted, as 
revealed in Chapter II of this thesis. 
 Chapter III traces the setbacks in Plan Dignidad to the government’s reckless 
decision to move into the Yungas without the necessary preparation.  The government’s 
plan was to adopt negotiations and strategies in the Yungas that paralleled those used in 
the Chapare.  The government, however, did not follow its initially intended four-phase 
plan, but instead skipped ahead to the fourth phase – bringing the military in to 
implement forced eradication, without previously laying the necessary groundwork.  Not 
surprisingly, the move into the Yungas failed and this failure served only to galvanize 
coca growers in the Chapare who were then able to rollback previous gains.   
 The Sanchez de Lozada and Mesa administrations were unable to deal effectively 





Lozada came into office with promises he did not keep and continued his reliance in 
favor of Plan Dignidad measures that already had been weakened by the push into the 
Yungas.  Also, Sanchez de Lozada made several political decisions that, in the eyes of the 
Bolivian population, mired his reputation as president: for example, pushing forward the 
gas pipeline through Chile during tense times; not resolving the Huampo problem at the 
outset; and failing to revitalize the economy.  On the other hand, Mesa initially did not 
deal with the Chapare growers and attempted to avoid the situation as much as possible.  
Mesa did not have a new strategy to replace Plan Dignidad; instead, when there was 
absolutely no choice but to negotiate, Mesa gave in to the coca growers so that he would 
rid himself of the problem.    
Chapter IV shows how the Morales administration largely confirms conventional 
wisdom about why Latin American countries avoid adopting aggressive counterdrug 
policies, but also calls attention to Morales’ grand strategy, which is based on reducing 
poverty and racial discrimination, advancing land reform and securing higher revenues 
for Bolivia from the extraction of its natural resources.  His policy of “cooperative 
eradication” serves, more importantly, to support his greater vision for the country.  
Despite continued pressure from the United States, Morales has only met minimum 
eradication standards.  Morales’ rhetoric on behalf of coca growing and his failure to 
eradicate have facilitated the growing of coca.  The easy ability to make money from 
coca in the illicit market has pushed more and more families into the business.  An 
interesting phenomenon is the reverse migration of city dwellers, who were once coca 
growers, back to the fields.  Although interdiction efforts appear to be more successful 
than those of his predecessors, the reality is that the overabundance of coca has led to 
increased coca production in the country, which has led, in turn, to more targets of 
opportunity for interdictors.  In fact, interdiction efforts continue to be similar in 
effectiveness to previous administrations. Today, though, the presence of Colombian and 







B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
Understanding a president’s grand strategy is crucial for determining what type of 
counterdrug policy a Latin American government will seek; how aligned that policy will 
be with that of the United States; and how susceptible that administration will be to U.S. 
pressure.  Banzer and Sanchez de Lozada, for example, both believed in a grand strategy 
based on the kind of neoliberal economic policies favored by the United States.  Based on 
this coincidence of U.S. and Bolivian government interests, it might be expected that both 
presidents would be equally receptive to U.S. preferences for tough drug control policies 
(and have the “political will” to carry them out).  This was not the case, however, since a 
president’s grand strategy involves more than just economics.  Banzer’s grand strategy 
incorporated clear ideas on the need to defeat corruption and end the Bolivian stigma of 
hosting narcotraffickers.  The aging Banzer wanted to leave behind a legacy of having 
ended the coca problem in Bolivia.  Sanchez de Lozada, on the other hand, pushed for 
neoliberal economics but limited his efforts to that venue.  He did not significantly 
involve himself with counterdrug policies in either his first or second presidential 
administration.  Finally, Morales’ grand strategy is grounded in the idea that cultural 
rights must be respected and the poverty gap reduced.  However, it is important to note 
that his lax policies on eradication are motivated more by providing a steady income to 
coca growers than by displaying defiance to the United States.   This has allowed the 
United States more room to maneuver in its dealings with Morales than many would have 
thought possible based on his background as a cocalero. 
The thesis also offers important lessons about how “political will” should be 
understood.  Too often, policy makers interpret “political will” as a government’s 
willingness to ignore pressure from interest groups.  This thesis shows, however, that the 
ability to implement policies often depends on a government’s ability to acknowledge 
and negotiate forcefully with interest groups such as cocaleros.  These interests groups 
are not going to go away, and they will continue to be strong factors affecting the 
formulation and implementation of Bolivian counterdrug policy.  According to this study, 
one can infer that coca growers seek:  (1) steady income; (2) respect of their culture; (3) 





studied and analyzed to understand it better and to find common grounds with that 
specific factor in order to arrive at an effective and sustainable policy that can be 
implemented. 
The thesis shows quite clearly that “forced” eradication still requires negotiations.  
The move into the Yungas failed because it did not adopt the negotiations part of the 
proposed plan for the region.  The government’s decision to move into the Yungas 
ignored the first three and most crucial phases of the plan, which called for the 
government to negotiate, persuade, and sell to the Yungas coca growers the benefits of a 
Plan Dignidad-like strategy in their area.  The decision to move into the region was 
doomed to fail because the government went directly into a show of force.  Arguably, the 
government’s energies would have been better spent on consolidating its gains in the 
Chapare.   
Negotiations with coca growers over eradication are crucial.  Negotiations show 
that the government respects the coca growers as a group and does not intend to 
marginalize them; simultaneously, the government is also showing respect for the 
growers’ culture and respect of the “sacred leaf.”  Much of Morales’ rhetoric, for 
example, surrounds the accusations that previous administrations did not treat coca 
growers with dignity and respect, which led to unnecessary human rights violations.   
 Negotiations and the law must be firm and conducted within the boundaries of 
Law 1008, which should be specific and applied.  The government must be clear on what 
areas exactly are authorized for coca growing and what areas are simply illegal for the 
cultivation of coca. The military and coca growers enter into conflicts in the Chapare 
because Law 1008 has designated the region a transitional zone.  Identifying this region 
as such, does not give the government full autonomy and authority to destroy coca in that 
region.  A transitional zone continues to enjoy quasi-protective status, and the vagueness 
of this designation allows both parties to be in the right.  Under its transitional status, 
Chapare cocaleros believe they are morally protected and, at least partially, protected 
under the law as well.  It is necessary for Law 1008 to be definite and specific as to the 
status of the Chapare – legal or illegal zone - to avoid the prolonged conflicts.  Forced 





achieved.  Negotiations over this are necessary to help legitimize Law 1008, which 
should then be firmly enforced.  The government should not agree to treaties that violate 
Law 1008 because this undermines the rule of law.  Furthermore, bending the rules only 
creates a precedence and justification for every future president or coca grower leader to 
try and shape or modify the law to meet his or her own objectives.  The law should be 
firm and clear so that party negotiations can take place on legitimate grounds and in the 
best interest of everyone 
Negotiations should consider and adopt those legitimate claims brought by 
cocaleros.  Alternative development, for example, has been a topic of contestation among 
coca growers.  They argue that alternative development is not working in certain areas, 
that funding is not directed down to the people that need it the most, and that a 
bureaucratic hierarchy slows the trickling process and allows money to remain in the 
higher echelons of the system.  Most experts agree that this is a problem that needs to be 
addressed, but it is difficult to fix this problem without involving the growers.  However 
this solution is accomplished, the government should consider two suggestions to 
ameliorate this process.  One is for the government to solicit coca grower leaders who can 
advise and cite the problems and gaps in the current alternative development process.  
Second, the government should consider offering job opportunities other than farming to 
growers. Factories, for example, could be built in areas where feasible and additional 
community infrastructure could be built to provide benefits to ex-coca growers. 
Finally, a combination of stick and carrots is needed – all negotiations do not 
work, as the Sanchez de Lozada and Morales administrations show.  Forced eradication is 
necessary, plainly, because it helps keep a balance on the supply of the main ingredient of 
cocaine.  In addition, a public relations campaign emphasizing the importance of gaining 
a handle on excess coca and narcotrafficking is equally important in negotiating with the 
cocaleros.  Public pressure needs to be brought to bear on the cocaleros to gain 
concessions.  Banzer did this effectively by linking illegal coca growing in the Chapare 
with drug trafficking.  Today, excess coca production can be blamed for a series of 






more harm to the country than good.  For example, powerful coca cartels have reappeared 
and drugs have made their way into the cities, polluting the young and bringing increased 
violence.  
A number of factors make the war on drugs a long and painful one for all parties 
involved.  Latin American countries are more specifically at the tip of the sword because 
they not only have to implement the policies but also struggle with their own drug 
problems, while fending off influential drug cartels and other interests groups.  A study of 
the Bolivian case offers an important lesson: firm policies accompanied with negotiations 
with major interest groups can result in gains; nevertheless, once gains have been 
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